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Chapter I
Introduction
In 2002 the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel
was awarded to Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith. It was not only a distinction
for the work of the two laureates, but also for the field of experimental economics.
Motivating the prize for the laureates the committee stated: Controlled laboratory
experiments have emerged as a vital component of economic research and, in certain
instances, experimental results have shown that basic postulates in economic theory
should be modified.1
The four studies in the work at hand demonstrate the variety of fields on which
the methods of experimental economics can be applied to. The first study deals
with culture and presentation effects, the second study reports on team incentives,
the third study checks the performance of behavioral equilibrium concepts and the
fourth study deals with learning behavior of populations and single individuals. Each
study is self-contained and based on a discussion paper.
Chapter II is based on a discussion paper by Goerg and Walkowitz and investigates
the impact of game presentations dependent on ethnical affiliation.2
Two continuous prisoner’s dilemma games where decision makers can choose an
individual level of cooperation from a given range of possible actions are introduced.
Both games represent the same logical and strategical problem. In the first game, a
1refer to http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2002/public.html
2Sebastian J. Goerg and Gari Walkowitz, "Presentation Effects in Cross-Cultural Experiments
- An Experimental Framework for Comparisons", Discussion Paper No. 4/2008, Bonn Graduate
School of Economics, University of Bonn.
1
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positive transfer creates a positive externality for the opposite player. In the second
game, this externality is negative.
Accomplishing a cross-cultural experimental study involving subjects from the West
Bank and Jerusalem (Israel) we test for a strategic presentation bias applying these
two games. Subjects in the West Bank show a substantially higher cooperation level
in the positive externality treatment than in the one with negative externality. In
Jerusalem no presentation effect is observed.
Discussing our findings, we argue that a cross-cultural comparison leads to only
partially meaningful and opposed results if only one treatment condition is evalu-
ated. In our setting cooperation was significantly higher in the West Bank than
in Jerusalem in the game with positive externality. In contrast cooperation was
significantly higher in Jerusalem than in the West Bank in the game with negative
externality. We therefore suggest a complementary application and consideration of
different presentations of identical decision problems within cross-cultural research.
Chapter III is based on a paper by Goerg, Kube and Zultan and deals with the
impact of reward schemes and production functions in teams.3
The importance of fair and equal treatment of workers is at the heart of the debate
in organizational management. In this regard, we study how reward mechanisms,
either egalitarian or discriminating, and production technologies, given by produc-
tion functions of either complementarity or substitutability, affect effort provision
in teams. Our experimental results demonstrate that unequal rewards can poten-
tially increase productivity by facilitating coordination, and that the effect strongly
interacts with the exact shape of the production function.
Our findings suggest that designing (production) tasks in a way that makes workers’
efforts complements i.e., the impact of a worker’s input increases in the size of the
others’ input, rather than substitutes may lead to a major cost advantage. Since peer
3Sebastian J. Goerg, Sebastian Kube and Ro’i Zultan, "Treating Equals Unequally - Incentives,
Motivation and Production Technology in Teams.", Journal of Labor Economics, forthcoming.
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pressure constitutes a complementarity in effort exertion, the mere strengthening of
social ties amongst the workforce alone might have a strong impact on productivity.
We show that whenever the organizational technology is one of complementarity, the
usage of a discriminating reward scheme might be potentially efficiency-enhancing.
Thus equal treatment of equals is neither a necessary nor a sufficient prerequisite
for eliciting high performance in teams.
Chapter IV is based on a paper by Goerg and Selten and tests the success of three
stationary concepts in describing experimental data gathered in oligopoly markets.4
The concepts experimentally tested are Nash equilibrium, impulse balance equilib-
rium and payoff-sampling equilibrium. The latter two equilibria are behavioral con-
cepts that either depend on tendencies to play the ex-post best strategy (impulse
balance equilibrium) or on samples of payoffs for each strategy (payoff-sampling
equilibrium).
In the experiment two different cyclic duopoly games were played and the aggre-
gated frequencies of entering an occupied market were the test criteria to be de-
scribed by the three concepts. The comparison of the three concepts with mixed
strategies shows that the order of performance from best to worst is as follows:
payoff-sampling equilibrium, impulse balance equilibrium, and Nash equilibrium. In
addition our data exhibit a weak but significant tendency over time in the direction
of coordination at a pure strategy equilibrium.
Chapter V is based on a discussion paper by Chmura, Goerg and Selten and examines
learning behavior in repeated 2× 2 games.5
In this study we introduce four new learning models: impulse balance learning,
impulse matching learning, action-sampling learning, and payoff-sampling learning.
With this models and together with the models of self-tuning EWA learning and
4Sebastian J. Goerg and Reinhard Selten, "Experimental Investigation of a Cyclic Duopoly
Game", Experimental Economics, 12(3), 2009.
5Thorsten Chmura, Sebastian J. Goerg and Reinhard Selten, "Learning in Experimental 2× 2
games", Discussion Paper No. 18/2008 Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn.
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reinforcement learning, we conduct simulations over 12 different 2 × 2 games and
compare the results with experimental data. Hereby, the learning rules have to
meet two challenges: First, can they reproduce the aggregate behavior of a human
population and second do they adequately describe the observed behavior of a single
individual?
Our results are twofold: while our newly introduced models are able to capture the
distribution of decisions on the aggregate level much better then self-tuning EWA
does, self-tuning EWA describes the individual data in a more accurate way then
our models do.
Chapter II
Presentation Effects in Cross-Cultural Experiments
II.A Introduction
Nowadays it is widely accepted - even by economists - that human behavior is not
solely driven by the ratio of the homo economicus. Many experiments have shown
that subjects’ behavior can be influenced amongst others by their risk attitudes,
fairness or and equity preferences, and even by the mere presentation of a decision
problem1. A vast body of literature demonstrates that differently framed descrip-
tions of decision tasks can lead to divergent and non-rational behavior (refer to
Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Levin, Schneider and Gaeth, 19982). Furthermore,
other contributions have shown that subjects’ performance can be influenced even
by the mere presentation form of a decision problem (e.g., Pruitt, 1967; and Sel-
ten and Berg, 1970). In this broad field, studies dealing with public goods games
creating either positive externalities (public good) or negative externalities (public
bad) are well established (e.g., Andreoni, 1995; Sonnemans, Schram and Offerman,
1998; Willinger and Ziegelmeyer, 1999; Cookson, 2000; and Park, 2000). Results
from these publications in general suggest that experimental designs enabling pos-
itive externalities are aligned with significantly higher cooperation levels compared
to setups allowing for negative externalities3.
In this chapter we intend to analyze cultural affiliation as one factor leading to dif-
1E.g., Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Selten (1978), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000), Konow (2000), Pruitt (1967), Selten and Berg (1970).
2See also Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006) for a review on framing literature and framing
types.
3Applying a more complex experimental design Brewer and Kramer (1988) and Sell, Chen,
Hunter-Holmes, and Johansson (2002) found an effect that went in the opposite direction.
5
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ferent levels of cooperation dependent on two game presentation forms with positive
and negative externality. Since both cooperation mechanisms are crucial for human
interaction from an individual perspective as well as from a societal point of view
it is important to compare behavior under both conditions also on a cross-country
level to evaluate the cross-cultural validity of findings on cooperative behavior under
both conditions.
So far conducted cross-cultural experimental studies normally apply experimental
designs with one form of presentation. Possible implicitly induced presentation ef-
fects - although not in focus of the study - are ignored (e.g., Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-
Fujiwara, and Zamir, 1991; Anderson, Rodgers and Rodriguez, 2000; Henrich, 2000;
Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, Gintis, and McElreath, 2001; Buchan and
Croson, 2004; Buchan, Croson, and Johnson, 20044). To the best of our knowl-
edge there exist only two studies taking a cross-cultural perspective of framing or
presentation effects into account. The first work, a questionnaire study by Levin,
Gaeth, Evangelista, Albaum, and Schreiber, (2001), involves Americans and Aus-
tralians. Therein, American subjects stated to reduce a significantly higher amount
of red meat consumption if the negative consequences of not reducing were stressed
compared to a treatment in which the positive consequences of reducing were empha-
sized. Contrary, Australian subjects did not respond differently to the two frames.
In a second study, Sell et al. (2002) investigated the consistency and direction of
framing effects across different cultures. They found very similar patterns of coop-
eration both in the United States and in the People’s Republic of China. In both
countries group members were less cooperative in a standard public goods game
compared to the situation of a public bad setting.5 We will extend the approach
of Sell et al. (2002) with regard to a more extensive cross-cultural analysis and a
discussion of the behavioral and methodological consequences of our findings. For-
mally identical bargaining and cooperation setups might be perceived differently in
different countries and might unconsciously lead to unintended behavior. Knowing
4See for an specific international overview of public goods and commons dilemma studies Car-
denas and Carpenter (2004a,b).
5Sell et al (2002) entitled the first situation as a public good game and the second situation as
a resource goods dilemma.
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the impact of diametral frames might be essential for the design of institutions built
up to moderate the relationship between involved conflict parties.
The historical and political background of Israelis and Palestinians6 makes them a
promising testbed for investigating the link between cultural affiliation and cooper-
ative behavior. We will show that the awareness of the impact of culture on frame
perception should have importance for practical applications.
For our study we conducted two series of experiments with Palestinians located in
Abu-Dis (West Bank) and with Israelis from Jerusalem applying two continuous
two-person prisoner’s dilemma games which represent different presentations of the
same - structurally and functionally equivalent - decision task. That is, in both cases
individuals must choose between a maximization of their own profit or to cooperate
at some personal cost to increase joint payoff. Individuals can give up an immediate
benefit to sustain a resource for the other player’s use. Thus, in one experimental
treatment action creates a positive externality for the matched player. Contrary,
in our second experimental treatment action results in a negative externality. Like
a public goods dilemma our first treatment is a problem of contribution. Only
with positive contributions an efficiency increase is achieved. Similarly, our second
treatment, like a commons dilemma, is a problem of consumption. The lower the
share of personal consumption the higher efficiency. Expected utility theory suggests
these two types of presentations are equivalent since strategies and related payoffs
are equivalent. However, giving and taking are psychologically different actions and
findings from one set of studies may not be generalized to the other set (Brewer
and Kramer, 1986; Fleishman, 1988). This holds especially true in a cross-cultural
environment.
Our West Bank data show that the presentation can significantly influence decision
makers’ choices. In the positive externality condition substantially more cooperation
is manifested then in the negative externality condition. In contrast, the experiment
6At the moment, a Palestinian state does not exist. Most of our subjects are formally citizens
of the states of Israel and Jordan. Nevertheless, we will refer to them as Palestinians to ease the
notation.
Chapter II - Presentation Effects in Cross-Cultural Experiments 8
conducted in Jerusalem yielded different results. There, on an aggregate level, no
significant presentation effect can be detected. In both societies our data show that
neither the Nash equilibrium nor the social optimal strategy is reached.
Comparing the level of cooperation under each of our two conditions across the two
locations yields opposite conclusions about country-dependent cooperative behav-
ior. While behavior in the treatment condition with positive externality is more
cooperative in the West Bank, behavior in the treatment condition with negative
externality is more cooperative in Jerusalem. In contrast to this an evaluation of
all data gathered from each of the two populations shows no significant difference in
cooperation levels.
Our results shed new light on the impact of presentation conditioned by preferences
and social norms in different habitats. Therefore, we will argue that for deriving a
conclusion about a population’s cooperative behavior, different presentations of log-
ically identical experimental setups should be considered and evaluated adequately.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In the next part we will
introduce our experimental framework consisting of two logically identical games.
In the third section, we describe the method and procedure we applied conducting
the cross-cultural experimental study in the Westbank and in Jerusalem. In part
four, we present population-specific results. We compare data within and across
populations. The final section five discusses our findings and their impact on cross-
cultural research.
II.B Experimental Framework: Two new Games
The two applied games are both continuous prisoners’ dilemma games (PD) and
public goods games (PG) in which subjects can choose an individual level of cooper-
ation from a given range of possible actions7. Thus, in contrast to the classical PD
game, the question whether to cooperate or to defect is not a binary choice. In the
first game (PDP) a player’s decision creates a positive externality to the matched
7Refer to Appendix C.I. for further details on the PD- and PG-nature of the two games.
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player’s payoff, while in the second game (PDN) it induces a negative externality.
In the next subsection we will describe both the PDP game and the PDN game in
detail.
II.B.1 Continuous Prisoners’ Dilemma with Positive Exter-
nality (PDP)
At the beginning of the game, two (randomly) matched players i and j obtain an
initial endowment X = Xi = Xj. Each player then has the opportunity to transfer
an integer part a of X, nothing, or the entire amount X to the opposite player.
Both players choose a ∈ [0, X] simultaneously. Each amount a, which is transferred
to the paired player, will be multiplied by factor k yielding to an efficiency gain by
transferring a positive amount a. Players’ payoffs consist of the initial endowment
X minus the transferred amount a plus the obtained and k-multiplied amount a
transferred by the opposite player. Formally, player i’s payoff function is given by:
piPDPi = Xi − aPDPi + k · aPDPj , with Xi = X, aPDPi , aPDPj ∈ [0, X], and k > 1
The payoff of the opposite player j is calculated analogously. The only Nash equi-
librium is a∗i = a∗j = 0. Player i anticipates player j’s choice aPDPj = 0 and will
therefore also choose aPDPi = 0. The collective optimal choice is aˆi = aˆj = X since
it maximizes the joint payoff ΠPDP = pii + pij.
II.B.2 Continuous Prisoners’ Dilemma with Negative Exter-
nality (PDN)
The design of the PDN game is equivalent to the first game, but instead of choosing
an amount a which is transferred to the opposite player, decision makers must
choose an integer which is transferred from the other player. Again two players i
and j simultaneously interact. Initially, both receive an endowment X = Xi = Xj.
Each player then has the opportunity to transfer a part a, nothing, or the entire
amount X from the matched player. Thus, again, both players simultaneously
Chapter II - Presentation Effects in Cross-Cultural Experiments 10
choose a ∈ [0, X]. The difference X − a, which is respectively not transferred,
will be multiplied with k. Hence, by transferring low amounts or nothing efficiency
increases. In contrast to the PDP game, the amount a, which is transferred is not
multiplied. Players’ payoffs are determined by the multiplied difference of their
initial endowments X and the amount a taken by the opposite player, and the
amount a which players take away from the counterpart. Formally, player i′s payoff
function is given by:
piPDNi = (Xi − aPDNj ) · k + aPDNi , with Xi = X, aPDNi , aPDNj ∈ [0, X], and k > 1
Player j’s payoff is calculated analogously. The only Nash equilibrium is a∗i = Xj
and a∗j = Xi. Player i anticipates player j’s choice aPDNj = Xi and will therefore also
choose aPDNi = Xj. The optimal collective choice is aˆi = aˆj = 0 since it maximizes
the joint payoff ΠPDN = pii + pij.
II.B.3 Equivalence of the two Games
In both games player i’s payoff pii consists of two parts - a self-determined component
piiA and a part piiB resulting from player j’s actions. Therefore, the total payoff of
player i can be stated as: pii = piiA + piiB. Player i’s self-determined payoff fraction
in the PDP game is the amount XPDPi −aPDPi which is not given to the other player.
In the PDN game it is the amount aPDNi that is taken away from the other player.
The foreign determined amount k ·aPDPj for player i in the PDP game is the amount
which he receives from the matched player. In the PDN game the foreign determined
amount is the payoff fraction k · (XPDNi − aPDNj ) that the matched player leaves to
him. In addition, each possible strategy combination in one game can be described
by a strategy combination in the other game as well.
Figure 1 displays a graphical illustration of this equivalence. We will first turn our
attention to the first quadrant of the figure.
The first quadrant illustrates the composition of player i’s self-determined payoff
piiA. In PDP piiA is limited by player i’s own initial endowment XPDPi (given on the
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ordinate) and in PDN it is limited by the initial endowment XPDNj of the matched
player j (given on the abscissa) . The initial endowment X is the same in both
games and for both players. Thus, XPDPi and XPDNj form an isosceles triangle as
shown in the upper right section of the figure.
Player i chooses in the PDP-game the amount aPDPi (thick line on the ordinate),
which is transferred to the other player. Therefore his self-determined payoff is given
by XPDPi − aPDPi (thin line on the ordinate). In the PDN-treatment player i can
choose aPDNi (thick line on the abscissa), which ensures him the same self-determined
payoff. One can see in the figure that the self-determined payoff in PDP (thin line on
the ordinate) has the same size as the one in PDN (thick line on the abscissa). This
is ensured by the isosceles triangle given by the initial payoffs. The third quadrant
analogously illustrates player j’s self-determined payoff pijA.
Figure II.1: Graphical illustration for the equivalence of PDP and PDN
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If player i fixes his self-determined payoff as described in the first quadrant, the left
over in PDN XPDNj − aPDNi (thin line on the abscissa) equals the amount aPDPi
transferred in PDP (thick line on the ordinate). These amounts are part of player
j’s foreign-determined payoff pijB and are multiplied with k which is shown in the
second quadrant. The multiplier k is described as a straight line. The total amount
of pijB (including the multiplication with k) has to be taken from the ordinate in the
second quadrant. Analogously, player i’s foreign-determined payoff is given in the
fourth quadrant.
This illustrates that in each strategy space of the two games there exists a strategy
ai or a strategy-combination (ai; aj) that also exists in the corresponding game in
terms of cooperation, as well as individual and collective payoff.
II.C Experimental Procedure
The experiments were conducted in May 2006. The West Bank sessions were run
at the AlQuds University located in the Westbank, close to the city of Jerusalem.
Observations from Jerusalem were gained at the RatioLab of the Hebrew University
in Jerusalem. In both universities students from different departments participated8.
Showing up for the experiment each student received a fixed payment of 25 NIS. At
each university both games were played as one-shot games, applying the pen and
paper method. We have chosen one-shot games to avoid confounding framing effects
with strategical issues. Table II.1 displays the applied treatments.
Experiments were run by local helpers comprehensively instructed and supported by
the authors, who stayed in the background. We are aware that this might result in an
experimenter effect. We decided to choose this procedure to avoid self-presentation
and face-saving effects (see, e.g., Bond & Hwang, 1986) of unexperienced subjects
8In Israel only subjects with very limited experimental experience were recruited (excluding
previous collaborations in trust game, prisoner’s dilemma, gift exchange, or public goods game
experiments). Palestinian subjects had no experimental experience. The median age of Israeli
subjects was 25 years and 22 for Palestinian subjects. In Jerusalem nearly 40% of the participants
were female, in the West Bank nearly 30%. We checked with regression models for possible effects
of age and gender. We could not find any significant influence, neither for each separate subject
pool nor for the complete sample of observations.
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Session Game Location Independent observations
1 PDP West Bank 20
2 PDN West Bank 20
3 PDP Jerusalem 20
4 PDN Jerusalem 20
Table II.1: Treatment conditions.
resulting from the presence of people from foreign countries. Since we are interested
in the pure presentation effect this procedure seems to be justified.
Instructions were written in neutral language avoiding terms like ‘give’ and ‘take’.
According to the location, the instructions were either in Hebrew or Arabic9. They
differed between treatments only by the direction of the conducted transfer. Accord-
ingly, transfers were to be realized either to player j or from player j. This procedure
ensured that only the technical presentation and not the wording or further frames
could influence subjects’ behavior.
Subjects were initially endowed with X = 10 Talers in the opening of every game10.
The multiplier k was fixed with k = 2. The individual payoff in the Nash equilibrium
was 10 Talers, for each player. The Pareto optimal outcome generated 20 Talers,
respectively. In the run of the experiment participants received no feedback on
matched player’s decisions.
After running the experiment two questionnaires were passed out. In the first ques-
tionnaire we asked participants for their first-order beliefs on the behavior of the
matched player11. Correct beliefs were rewarded with addition of 1 Taler. The sec-
ond questionnaire covered socio-demographic questions. At the end of the session
the outcome for each participant was calculated, converted into NIS, and paid out.
9To avoid translation errors regarding the task and the procedure instructions were translated
by natural speakers from German into the corresponding language and afterward translated back
into German applying the back-translation method (Brislin 1970). For instructions see Appendix
B.
10Taler=Experimental Currency. During the experiment all transfers were made in Taler. The
exchange rate from Taler to NIS is 1 Taler = 2.5 NIS. We adjusted expected hourly payoffs to the
average hourly wage of a local student helper.
11We are aware of the fact that stated beliefs can be biased by prior decisions already undertaken.
However, since actual unbiased decisions are more valuable for our analysis, we agreed upon this
procedure.
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II.D Results
In this section we present the results of our study. First, we start with our find-
ings regarding the Palestinian subjects. Afterward we will present the Israeli data.
Finally, we will merge and compare results from both societies. The basis of our
analysis is the degree of cooperation exhibited by the participants. In the PDP game
it is the transferred amount (aPDP ) and in the PDN game it is the amount left to
the other player (10− aPDN).
II.D.1 Palestinian Choices
Table II.2 gives an overview on Palestinians’ aggregated transfers and beliefs in both
conditions:
Actions Beliefs
PDP PDN PDP PDN
Mean 7.10 2.65 6.05 2.75
Median 7 2 5 2
Mode 5 2 5 0
SD 2.36 2.08 2.89 2.34
Table II.2: Descriptive statistics for Palestinian choices.
On average, under the PDP-condition 7.10 Talers are transferred to the opposite
player, contrary to the PDN-treatment, where 2.65 Talers are left. The observed
treatment effect is highly significant (p < .001, Mann-Whitney test, two-sided).
Moreover, in the PDP-treatment the quadratic distance to the social optimum (∆2 =
.137) is significantly smaller than to the Nash equilibrium (∆2 = .557, p = .002,
Wilcoxon signed rank test, two-sided)12. In the PDN-treatment the opposite holds.
Here, the quadratic distance to the social optimum (∆2 = .582) is significantly
bigger than to the Nash equilibrium (∆2 = .112, p < .001, Wilcoxon signed rank
test, two-sided). Our findings get additional support evaluating median (7 vs. 2) and
mode (5/10 vs. 2) values from both treatments. Results for beliefs are in line with
12The average quadratic distance is defined as ∆2 = 1n
∑n
i=1(ri − t)2, with n being the number
of participants, ri ∈ (0, 1) being the transfer rate of player i, and t ∈ (0, 1) the predicted transfer
rate. To apply the quadratic distance concept we calculated relative transfers.
Chapter II - Presentation Effects in Cross-Cultural Experiments 15
the behavior. There is more cooperation expected in the PDP game (6.05 Talers)
than in the PDN game (2.75 Talers). The observed treatment effect for the beliefs
is also highly significant (p < .001, Mann-Whitney-test, two-sided). Comparing
actions and beliefs we find no statistically significant difference. This holds for both
treatments. According to this we conclude our first result:
Result 1: The formal presentation of the game influences Palestinian subjects’
actions and beliefs substantially. Cooperation (and its expectation) is significantly
and economically higher under the PDP-condition than in the PDN-treatment.
II.D.2 Israeli Choices
Israelis’ aggregated actions and beliefs are presented in the following Table II.3:
Actions Beliefs
PDP PDN PDP PDN
Mean 4.40 4.55 3.40 3.40
Median 4 5 4 4
Mode 2 5 4 0
SD 2.95 3.38 2.50 3.14
Table II.3: Descriptive statistics for Israeli choices.
On average, under the PDP-condition 4.40 Talers are transferred to the opposite
player. Similarly, in the PDN-treatment on average 4.55 Talers are chosen not to be
taken by the participants. There is no statistical significant difference in behavior
across the two treatments (p = .946, Mann-Whitney-test, two-sided). Furthermore,
we observe a weak tendency to play according to the Nash equilibrium - the quadratic
distance to the Nash equilibrium (PDP: ∆2 = .276; PDN: ∆2 = .316) is smaller in
both treatments than the distance to the social optimum (PDP: ∆2 = .396; PDN:
∆2 = .406). However, in both treatments the difference is not significant (PDP:
p = .404; PDN: p = .530, both Wilcoxon signed rank test, two-sided). The mean
beliefs for both games are identical. On average, under both conditions 3.40 Talers
were expected to be contributed from the opposite player. No statistical evidence for
a difference can be found (p = .967, Mann-Whitney-test, two-sided). These findings
get further support considering median values from both treatments.
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Contrasting actions and beliefs we find slightly higher amounts in actions compared
to stated beliefs (4.40 Talers vs. 3.40 Talers) for the PDP-treatment (p = .047,
Wilcoxon signed rank test, two-sided). No statistically significant difference is de-
tected under the PDN-condition. We summarize this as our second result:
Result 2: No evidence is found that the formal presentation of the game influences
Israeli subjects’ behavior or beliefs in a significant way. Both conditions imply a
similar level of cooperation (and its expectation).
II.D.3 Comparison of Presentation Effect-Size and Merging
the Data
Results 1 and 2 show that the difference in mean cooperation levels among the two
treatments is higher in the West Bank than in Jerusalem. We refer to this difference
as the effect-size caused by the two different presentations of the game.
In Jerusalem the impact of the presentation form is close to zero, on average, the
observed cooperation level is 1.5% lower in the PDP-condition. Formed beliefs are
exactly the same across the two games. In contrast, actions (beliefs) in the West
Bank are 44.5% (33%) more cooperative under the PDP-condition.
We tested the absolute value of the difference between the two treatment effects with
a Monte-Carlo approximation of a two-sided permutation tested with 50,000 draws.
The test computed the probability for obtaining a sample with the same, or a larger
difference between the two effect sizes by randomly assigning each single action (or
belief) in PDP and PDN to one of the two locations, keeping the condition fixed at
the same time. In at most 1% of the permutations an equal or higher difference was
obtained for actions as well as for beliefs. This corresponds to a p-level of p ≤ .01.
This finding, together with Results 1 and 2, leads to our third result:
Result 3: Subjects in the West Bank are more sensitive to the game presentation
than subjects from Jerusalem. The differences between observed behavior and beliefs
in the two games are both significantly and economically higher in the West Bank
compared to Jerusalem.
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We now want to compare our findings cross-culturally for each treatment condition
in the two locations. We will start with the transfer behavior in the West Bank and
Jerusalem in the PDP game. Afterward we turn our attention to the PDN game.
Figure II.2 gives the mean level of cooperation for observed behavior beliefs in the
two treatments.
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Graphs by game
Figure II.2: Location specific mean cooperation levels in the 2 treatments.
In the PDP-condition, on average, Palestinian subjects have transferred 7.10 Talers
to their counterparts, while Israelis choose 4.40 Talers in this treatment-condition.
Similarly, on average subjects in theWest Bank expect the matched player to transfer
6.05 Talers compared to 3.40 Talers which reflect Israelis’ expectations toward their
counterparts (see Tables II.2 and II.3). Both differences are highly statistically
significant (p < 0.01 and p < .01, Mann-Whitney test, two-sided). Hence, we
conclude our fourth result:
Result 4: In the West Bank cooperation is significantly higher under the PDP-
condition than in Jerusalem. Moreover, under this condition stated beliefs are sub-
stantially and significantly higher in the West Bank than in Jerusalem.
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In the PDN-treatment, on average, Israelis have left 4.55 Talers to their counterparts.
Contrary, Palestinians choose to contribute only 2.65 Talers on average under this
treatment condition. Similarly, Israelis expect the matched player not to transfer
3.40 Talers compared to 2.75 Talers which reflect Palestinian expectations toward
their counterparts (see Tables II.2 and II.3). The difference in actions is weakly sig-
nificant (p < .10, Mann-Whitney-test, two-sided). Comparing stated beliefs delivers
no significant effect. Thus, our fifth result states:
Result 5: Israelis cooperate more under the PDN-condition than Palestinians do.
Furthermore, under this condition the mean belief on cooperation by Israelis is higher
than the expectations quoted by Palestinians.
Taken together, Results 4 and 5 directly lead us to a further stunning result:
Result 6: Statistically robust results from different locations gathered under one
presentation condition do not necessarily hold for other presentations of the same
decision task applied in the same locations.
Our results clearly show that depending on the presentation form we observe diver-
gent levels of cooperation in the West Bank and Jerusalem.
West Bank Jerusalem
Actions Beliefs Actions Beliefs
Mean: 4.88 4.40 4.48 3.40
Median: 5 5 5 4
Mode: 5 5 5 0
SD: 3.15 3.09 3.13 2.80
∆2Nash: 0.334 0.287 0.296 0.192
∆2Pareto: 0.359 0.407 0.400 0.512
Table II.4: Descriptive statistics and quadratic distances for aggregated data from
the West Bank and Jerusalem.
In a next and final step we try to elicit whether cooperation in general is higher
in one of the two subject pools involved. Hence we investigate all 80 independent
observations (from PDP- and PDN-condition) gathered in the two societies. Table
II.4 gives an overview on actions and beliefs from both samples.
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On average, Palestinians contribute 4.88 Talers when both treatments are consid-
ered. Similarly, Israelis add 4.48 Talers. There is no evidence for a statistical
difference among the involved subject-pools (p = .547, Mann-Whitney-test, two-
sided). The same can be stated for merged beliefs. Here, Palestinians on average
expect to receive 4.40 Talers, and Israelis expect 3.40 Talers from their counterpart.
Again, no statistical difference can be detected across both subject-pools (p = .1938,
Mann-Whitney test, two-sided). Moreover, we observe no substantial difference
among the quadratic distances to the Nash-equilibrium (∆2 = .334 and ∆2 = .296,
p = .547, Mann-Whitney-test, two-sided) and to the Pareto optimum (∆2 = .359
and ∆2 = .400, p = .547, Mann-Whitney-test, two-sided) of transfer amounts from
both societies. Our results considering actions are supported by evaluating median
(5 vs. 5) and mode (5 vs. 5) values from both treatments and samples. Equally, for
stated beliefs we find that median (5 vs. 4) values do not substantially differ13.
For further insights into this similarity of aggregate behavior we calculated for each
location the relative frequency of cooperation levels above the overall mean, which
is the average cooperation level if all presentations and locations are considered. In
both locations a similar fraction of transferred amounts is above the overall mean:
57 % in Abu Dis and 55% in Jerusalem. Binomial confidence intervals for these
frequencies show with 95% of confidence that the relative frequency of transferred
amounts above the overall mean is between 41% and 73% in Abu Dis and and
between 38% and 71% in Jerusalem.
Given these similarities in behavior and beliefs, our seventh and last result is:
Result 7: In the aggregated data from both treatments no significant difference
between the levels of cooperation (and its expectation) in the Westbank and Jerusalem
can be found.
13Mode values also support this finding. There, 5 is the amount chosen the second highest time
by participants. This amount was chosen in 9 from 40 cases, contrary to the actual mode=0 which
was chosen 10 times out of 40.
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II.E Summary and Discussion
The aim of this work was to investigate the impact of game presentation dependent
on cultural affiliation. Merging the experimental application of two logically and
strategically identical decision problems in a cross-cultural study we demonstrated
that data obtained from only one presentation form might lead to only partly valid
results and conclusions on population-specific behavior. This finding holds especially
true if results are compared and evaluated across ethnical borders.
Our results from the West Bank have shown that the formal presentation of a de-
cision problem can influence subjects’ choices and beliefs substantially. The coop-
eration level and associated beliefs are significantly higher when subjects can create
positive externalities toward each other compared to a situation wherein resulting
externalities are negative. In the positive condition subjects from the West Bank
are more willing to transfer higher amounts to voluntarily increase mutual welfare.
On average, this attitude is also expected from the opposite player. Contrary, in
the negative condition subjects leave relatively less to the counterpart. In this inter-
action also more negative beliefs about the opponents’ behavior are formed. These
findings give support to prior work by Andreoni (1995), Sonnemans et al. (1998),
Willinger and Ziegelmeyer (1999), and Park (2000).
The behavior of our Palestinian subjects is analogous with results from goal fram-
ing experiments (e.g., Meyerowitz and Chaiken, 1987; Levin, Schneider and Gaeth,
1998). In these experiments the negative formulation of an identical problem has
an higher impact on subjects behavior than a positive one. The observed attitude
could be connected to the concept of loss aversion and the so-called endowment ef-
fect as introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Thaler (1980) and Kahneman,
Knetsch, and Thaler (1990). It is possible that, even if the technical presentation
of the implemented game designs was kept strictly neutral, Palestinians perceive an
amount taken away from them as a substantial loss, while they perceive an amount
voluntarily given away not, or less, as a loss. Or, in other words, Palestinians are
more sensitive to a loss induced by a second person compared to a loss induced
Chapter II - Presentation Effects in Cross-Cultural Experiments 21
by themselves. As a consequence of this cognition, they might react much more
sensitively to the threat of a possible loss induced by the right of the second player
to take away any amount as compared to the situation where they can determine
themselves which amount to give away. To avoid this expected loss induced by the
matched player, players take more from the matched player and thus cooperation is
on a lower level in the PDN game compared to the PDP game. This might deliver
an explanation why Palestinians seem to obtain a higher benefit from doing a good
rather than from not doing a bad deed14.
An alternative explanation refers to the action itself. In the PDP-game action leads
to cooperation whereas under the PDN-condition the opposite holds. There, action
results in competitive and less efficient behavior. The difference in the sensitivity
toward the given frame might stem from a different attitude towards action de-
pending on power in general. Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and Magee (2003) have shown
that priming high power leads to increased action in a social dilemma regardless of
whether that action had pro-social or anti-social consequences. Being primed with
power brings participants to both give more to and to take more from a commonly
shared resource. The different perception of own power of Palestinians - performing
notably more action in the PDP-game - and Israelis - showing a similar degree of
action in both conditions - may deliver an approach to explain behavioral differ-
ences across subject pools and cultures. Future research should address this issue
by linking different concepts of self image (e.g., power perception, self esteem) and
situational power to decisions.
Future studies have to analyze whether Palestinians’ behavior is similar to Western
subjects’ behavior as the cited public goods game framing results suggest or whether
and how it is specifically rooted in the Arabic culture. Herrmann, Thöni, and
Gächter (2008) give evidence for the latter conjecture. They have found that Arabian
participants are not - unlike most decision makers from Western populations who
cooperate more under a punishment condition - very sensitive to the threat and
14Andreoni (1995) argues that utility of people increases if they perceive the act of transferring
as doing something good (“warm-glow”) and decreases when they perceive it as doing something
bad (“cold-prickle”).
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enforcement of punishment in public goods game setups. As a consequence, although
Palestinian choices in our framework appear to be similar to findings in Western
societies the driving motives behind them could differ.
Although geographically not far away located from the West Bank, experiments run
in Jerusalem yielded different results. There, aggregated subjects’ actions and be-
liefs appear to be unaffected across treatments in terms of the measured outcome.
No significant presentation effect can be verified. Israelis seem to show a similar be-
havioral attitude in both treatments. This evidence might be rooted in the structure
of the Israeli society. The Israeli society is ethnically heterogeneous and consists of
different subcultures. Furthermore, the gaps between these ethnic groups do not
decrease. In fact, the segregation of the society increases further, especially since
the breakdown of the Soviet Union15. As Knack and Kefer (1999) point out, co-
operation on the national level of societies is negatively influenced by the degree of
ethnic differences within these societies. Trust and cooperative norms are strong
within ethnic groups but weak among different groups. Subjects in heterogeneous
societies might be less influenced by the presentation of a problem since they already
apply a certain pattern of thought on an decision problem. Further studies must
address the cause for the similarity of behavior displayed under different presenta-
tion conditions. Do Israelis actually perceive the two games as presentation forms of
the same decision problem, or do they apply different approaches leading to similar
behavioral consequences and outcome?
As Levin et al. (2001), we observe that subjects in some regions might respond to
framing effects, while others do not. In addition to this, we have shown that this
might confront results from cross-cultural research with new challenges: Comparing
levels of cooperation under each of the conditions across subject pools might lead
to opposing conclusions about society-specific behavioral attitudes. Palestinians
display a relatively higher cooperation level and more positive beliefs on opponent
player’s contributions than Israelis when only the positive externalities condition
is considered. Contrary, Israelis cooperate relatively more and state substantially
15Compare Mark (1994), Cohen and Haberfeld (1998), and Fershtman & Gneezy (2001).
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higher beliefs when only the negative externalities condition is regarded. However,
when all available data gathered from each of the two populations are evaluated, we
find no evidence that relative cooperation levels and associated beliefs are different.
These striking results would not have been detected by the implementation of a mere
one-sided experimental approach. Taking findings from different presentations into
account might not only enrich socio-economic theory but also refine our experimental
methodology.
To conclude, recognizing the impact of the presented frame might be essential for
the design of culture-sensitive institutions or the conduct of international negotia-
tions where foreign agents repeatedly interact for the first time in rapidly changing
environments. Bargaining and cooperation setups might be perceived differently by
decision makers depending on their ethnical background and some strategies may
generate higher levels of cooperation and agreements than others. For example, to
maintain peace in a border region of two conflict parties both sides could be asked
to take efforts to reduce their hostile armed assaults by withdrawal of armed troops
or to send more unarmed peace keepers into the region. This example shows that
our findings and the awareness of them have potential importance for application.
Chapter III
Treating Equals Unequally - Incentives in Teams
III.A Introduction
A general feature of incentive schemes in organizations is a non-uniform distribution
of benefits among its agents, which usually accounts for the heterogeneity in agents’
ability and performance. As long as the discrimination is based on individual differ-
ences, i.e., as long as unequal agents are rewarded unequally, there should be little
scope for fairness considerations to induce dissonance among the agents.1 However,
a recent theoretical model developed by Eyal Winter (2004) shows that it might even
be optimal to treat equal agents unequally – depending on externalities given by the
production function. This surprising result, derived under the standard assumptions
of fully rational, self-centered and money-maximizing behavior, seems to stand in
sharp contrast to the implications from research on fairness and equity preferences,
whose bottom line is that “even a small intrinsic concern for justice, .. may have
significant effects on .. wage structure” (Konow (2000), p. 1089; see also Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Mowday (1991), Young (1994) or Selten
(1978)). In the present paper, we experimentally explore the interaction in teams
and test within the framework of Winter’s model whether the psychological cost
of the inequality induced by a discriminating mechanism deters from the efficiency
of the theoretical optimal mechanism. Thus, to the best of our knowledge, we re-
port the first empirical evidence on the interplay between equity, coordination and
1A necessary assumption for this statement is that agents are aware of the individual differences
and do not misperceive the direction of the differences; which might for example not hold true if
agents are overconfident about their own performance (see Ross and Sicoly (1979) for early evidence
on overconfidence about contribution to a joint project).
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production function within teams.2
The general model as described in Winter (2004) features n risk-neutral agents
who work on a project. Each agent i decides simultaneously whether to work
(ei = 1) or shirk (ei = 0). Exerting effort is connected with costs c, with c be-
ing constant across all agents. Individual effort is assumed to be non-observable
and non-contractible. Instead, agents’ rewards are contingent on the success of
the project, i.e., agents receive individual rewards b = (b1, ..., bn) if the project
succeeds and 0 otherwise. The probability p(k) of the project’s success is spec-
ified as a function of the number k of agents exerting effort, mapping the effort
profiles to [0, 1]. In this sense, p(k) can be interpreted as the project’s technol-
ogy or production function. We assume p(k) to be strictly increasing in k. De-
pending on the exact specification of p(k), the production function can be mod-
eled to have increasing or decreasing returns to scale. By increasing returns to
scale we mean that the production function is one of complementarity, i.e., that
p(k+ 1)− p(k) increases in k; whereas a production function of substitutability has
decreasing returns to scale, i.e., p(k+1)−p(k) is decreasing in k (k ∈ [0, ..., n−1]).3
In the following, a reward vector b (i.e. a reward mechanism) is said to be strongly
incentive-inducing if it induces all agents to exert effort as a unique Nash equilib-
rium, and it is optimal if it does so at minimal cost of rewards. The mechanism is
symmetric if rewards are constant across all agents. It can be shown that such a
symmetric, optimal, strongly incentive-inducing mechanism exists if and only if the
production function is one of substitutability. Contrarily, a production function of
complementarity implies the optimal, strongly incentive-inducing mechanism to be
fully discriminating – even if all agents are perfectly symmetric!
Consider that a technology of increasing returns to scale is a sufficient, but not a
2The existing literature on team production and teamwork, e.g., Alchian and Demsetz (1972),
Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) or Irlenbusch and Ruchala (2008), usually focusses on the problem
of free-riders and provides means to organize and discipline selfish workers. Complementing this
line of research, our paper points to the difficulties that can arise if incentive schemes originally
designed for selfish agents are applied to other-regarding agents; thus, interestingly, in our setup
it is the absence of selfish agents, and not their presence, that constitutes a potential source of
inefficiency for work teams.
3For the sake of simplicity we only consider the two extreme cases of increasing or decreasing
returns to scale here. In general, the production function could take any form, as long as it satisfies
the assumption of p(k) being strictly increasing in k.
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necessary, condition for full discrimination. In fact, it is only necessary that an
agent’s incentive to exert effort increases with the number of other agents who do
so, which for example might also be caused by some psychological effect like peer
pressure (cp. Kandel and Lazear (1992), Barron and Gjerde (1997), Falk and Ichino
(2006) or Mas and Moretti (2007) and the references therein).
The purpose of the present study is to experimentally test the key findings of Win-
ter’s model, namely whether subjects’ behavior is indeed sensitive to the externalities
given by the production technology, and whether a major incentive advantage really
exists when discriminating among perfectly identical agents; or if the psychological
cost of the unequal treatment of equals drives a wedge between the initially predicted
and the actually observed efficiency.
Ideally, these questions would be examined with ‘cloned’ workers acting in ‘cloned’
work environments which differ only with respect to the production function and
the reward schemes. To come close to this ideal world, we introduce a simple and
parsimonious laboratory experiment that allows us to analyze the interaction be-
tween production function, equity considerations, and reward scheme, while at the
same time ensuring that agents are perfectly identical. In the experiment, three
players work on a joint project and exert costly efforts. Their total sum of effort
determines the number of some goods produced by the joint project for a given
production function. The payoff of a player is given by the productivity (i.e., the
number of produced goods) multiplied by an individual reward, minus the cost of
effort. We create four different treatments by manipulating the characteristics of the
production function (either a function of complementarity or of substitutability) as
well as of the reward scheme (either a symmetric or a discriminating mechanism).
We find that, as predicted by Winter’s model, the subjects in our experiment re-
spond to the shape of the production function. The discriminating reward scheme
under the production function of complementarity achieves almost maximum effi-
ciency, whereas it leads to significantly lower efficiency rates under the production
function of substitutability. Moreover, our data suggest that subjects’ effort choices
are highly sensitive to their own reward, but largely unresponsive to the rewards
of the other two subjects in their group: The disadvantaged player (receiving the
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low reward) regularly exerts effort under the production function of complementar-
ity, notwithstanding the unequal treatment of equals. Contrarily, the symmetric
reward scheme significantly hampers efficiency, demonstrating that equal treatment
of equals is not necessarily a prerequisite for eliciting high performance in teams,
and that unequal treatment can facilitate coordination within the workforce.
The insights gained from our experiment are of significant importance for research
on optimal mechanism design in general, but especially in the context of work con-
tracts and organizations. As Winter puts it: “A large number of models in personnel
economics establishes that unequal treatment of unequal agents may have major in-
centive advantages. The particular importance of demonstrating the optimality of
treating equals unequally is that it potentially implies an additional gain for in-
equality in each of these models” (Winter (2004), p. 766). We complement this
assertion by ascertaining it in an empirical way.
In this regard, we contribute to the question of “equality versus inequality”, which
is at the heart of the debate in organizational management. Internal inequity is
thought to have a tendency to lead to morale problems and to interfere with team-
work (cp. Akerlof and Yellen 1990, Milgrom and Roberts 1992, or Bewley 1999,
chapter 6), whereas equal wages are usually associated with positive effects (e.g.,
increased peer monitoring or lower transaction costs, see Knez and Simester 2001
or Prendergast 1999). However, as Lazear (1989, p. 561) puts it, “.. it is far from
obvious that pay equality has these effects.” For example, equal wages do not account
for heterogeneity in agents’ ability and performance, and payment is not linked to
the individual’s marginal product, which in turn can lead to free-riding among self-
ish agents (cp. Holmstrom 1982). Moreover, as we demonstrate in our setup, equal
rewards make it hard to form exact beliefs about the others’ effort. In contrast,
the asymmetry that is created by unequal rewards has the potential to facilitate
coordination within the workforce, because it reduces strategic uncertainty about
each others’ actions.
In real-life organizations, this discrimination is often implemented through non-
monetary rewards, e.g., prestige, or by using artificial classifications or (job) titles
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for seemingly similar tasks, e.g., ‘Project Head’ or ‘Team Captain’.4 It is often
hidden to avoid negative reactions of inequality-averse workers, or fixed by an in-
ternal (pay) structure. For example, lawyers, consultants and accountants are paid
according to seniority. This special form of hidden discrimination creates common
knowledge about the stakes that everyone has in the project’s success, and thus
fosters cooperation and coordination; while at the same time it does not invoke eq-
uity concerns because everyone knows that his turn will come to be senior partner.
The experimental results in the present paper show that under a production func-
tion of complementarity even transparent discrimination contributes to efficiency,
yet hidden discrimination is effective.
Our study differs from existing experimental studies that analyze the interaction
between social preferences and reward schemes in several points. First, the evidence
up to now mainly stems from bilateral gift-exchange games between a principal and
a single agent (e.g., Fehr et al. (1993, 1997)). What is usually observed in this setup
is a positive wage-effort relationship; if the principal shares a large part of the total
output with the worker, the worker feels treated fairly and reciprocates by exerting a
high effort. While this suggests that most workers care about fairness along a vertical
dimension, our question about possible horizontal comparisons within the workforce
is usually not addressed.5 Second, the existing studies are mainly conducted in an
incomplete-contract framework where effort and/or wage is non-contractible, while
we allow for complete contracts.6 Third, the usual experimental setup features a
principal who can set wages anew in each round, but this introduces uncontrolled
elements of intentionality and reputation. Agents can withhold effort to punish and
enforce principals to pay higher wages in the future, which to us not only seems
4The ‘Team Captain’, as the one carrying the responsibility and possible blame for unsuccessful
results, is highly motivated to exert effort. Therefore, he functions to incentivize the other team
members in the same way as the high-reward agent in our model induces cooperation and high
productivity. Cp. also Winter (2004), p. 769.
5Two exceptions are notable which feature a multi-agents setup. In Charness and Kuhn (2007),
two workers differ in productivity. The authors find that co-workers’ wages do not matter much
for agents’ decisions. Contrarily, Abeler et al. (forthcoming) demonstrate that paying equal wages
to workers exerting different efforts leads to a strong decline in efficiency over time.
6In Keser and Willinger (2000) agents’ actions are hidden, but wage payments can be made
contingent on the observed output. However, again the focus is on the vertical comparison between
a principal and a single agent. Fehr et al. (2007) provide a direct comparison on the efficiency of
incomplete and complete contracts in a bilateral setup.
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difficult to reconcile with real-world work-relationships, but additionally is outside
the scope of Winter’s model. Fourth, to the best of our knowledge we are the first
to pay attention to the important role of the production function in a labor market
setting.7 Our finding that agents’ behavior is sensitive to the shape of the production
function should be taken into account in future empirical research on the interaction
between social preferences and reward schemes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we describe
the experimental design and derive theoretical predictions. Subsequently, the exper-
imental results are presented and discussed in Section 3, and Section 4 concludes.
III.B The Experiment
Experimental Design Exact control over players’ risk-preferences and over the
underlying cost- and production-functions is crucial for testing Winter’s theoretical
model. We therefore use a deterministic representation of his model for the experi-
ment.8 In our game we have three agents working on a joint project. Each agent i
individually decides whether to work (effort level ei = 1) or shirk (effort level ei = 0),
and the individual cost of exerting effort is 90 Taler (our experimental currency).
The individual payoff of agent i is given by the total number of goods produced
multiplied by agent’s individual reward per unit produced, minus his effort costs.
The output of the project, i.e. the number of produced units, depends on the num-
ber of agents
∑
i ei choosing to work, and on our treatment variable production
function:
number of units produced if...
production function
∑
i ei = 0
∑
i ei = 1
∑
i ei = 2
∑
i ei = 3
complementarity (COM) 20 40 65 100
substitutability (SUB) 20 55 80 100
7Normann et al. (2007) examine the relation between production function and the existence of
large-buyers’ discounts.
8The following game can easily be rewritten in a probabilistic way, which is the interpretation
used byWinter (2004). We instead opt for the deterministic representation to impose risk-neutrality
over the final outcome of the project, i.e., we pay the expected value of a lottery rather than to
actually implement the lottery. This allows us to abstract from subjects’ individual risk preferences.
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The first case (COM) describes a production function of complementarity. The
technology has increasing returns to scales, since the number of produced units (the
output of the project) is P (0) = 20 if all agents shirk, P (1) = 40 if two agents
shirk, P (2) = 65 if only one agent shirks and P (3) = 100 if all agents work, thus
P (3) − P (2) > P (2) − P (1) > P (1) − P (0). In the second case (SUB), we have
a production function of substitutability. The technology has decreasing returns to
scale, since P (3)− P (2) < P (2)− P (1) < P (1)− P (0).
Agents’ rewards are made contingent on the output of the project and the reward
scheme or remuneration scheme, which we vary across treatments. The reward
scheme in treatments 444COM and 444SUB is symmetric. Each agent in the group
receives a reward of 4 Taler per produced unit. Contrarily, the mechanism imple-
mented in treatments 345COM and 345SUB is a discriminating one: agents’ reward
per produced unit is either 3, 4, or 5 Taler (with each possibility occurring ex-
actly once). At the same time, the sum of the individual rewards does not differ
across the reward mechanisms. For example, the total reward costs in case that
all agents shirk equals 3(4 · 20) = 240 under the symmetric reward scheme, and
3 · 20 + 4 · 20 + 5 · 20 = 240 under the discriminating reward scheme.
Implementation Our experiment was conducted in a labor market framing,
avoiding loaded terms (e.g., ‘shirk’ or ‘success’). We used the same procedure in
each treatment condition. Upon arrival, participants were randomly divided into
groups of three. In the treatments with a discriminating reward scheme, the three
possible rewards were randomly assigned within each group. The written instruc-
tions were distributed and read out aloud. Afterwards, subjects could pose questions
in private, and had to answer a set of computerized control questions to ensure that
everybody had understood the game and to make subjects familiar with the op-
eration of the program. Then subjects were told their own reward and the other
players’ rewards, and simultaneously had to decide between working or shirking.
Afterwards, it was announced that we were additionally interested in their beliefs
about the other subjects’ behavior, and each subject had to state what they expected
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the first and the second other player in their group to choose.9 In case that their
belief fully matched the actual behavior, subjects were paid an additional 20 Taler.
Only then we announced that five additional rounds of the game would follow, in
which everything was kept constant (individual rewards, costs, production function
and group composition). This was done to allow for possible learning to take place.10
After our experiment, subjects had to complete a social-value orientation test11 and
a socio-economic questionnaire.
The computerized experiments were run in 2007 and 2009 at the University of Bonn.
Participants were randomly recruited via email invitation out of approximately 3000
persons from the BonnEconLab’s subject pool (including mostly undergraduate stu-
dents from a large variety of fields). For each treatment, we ran two sessions with 18
subjects each; totalling 12 independent matching groups (all rounds) or 36 indepen-
dent decisions (only first round) per treatment.12 A session lasted approximately 70
minutes. Subjects were paid for their decision and their belief in the first round, and
additionally for one randomly selected round (which was constant across all subjects
within a session) out of the subsequent five rounds. Talers earned in the experiment
were converted at a rate of 80 Taler = 1 Euro. Subjects received a show-up fee of 4
Euros and earned on average approx. 7 Euro in the main experiment.
III.B.1 Behavioral Predictions
Figure III.1 shows players’ payoffs as a function of his reward-type and his decision.
As can be seen, the reward per unit produced that is needed to make an agent
9E.g., a player receiving a reward of 3 Taler per unit had to choose between ‘4’ and ‘5’ shirk, ‘4’
and ‘5’ work, ‘4’ works and ‘5’ shirks, or ‘4’ shirks and ‘5’ works. To keep the procedure constant,
in 444COM and 444SUB we also asked separately for the behavior of the two other players in the
group.
10We acknowledge that repeated play may have promoted reciprocal strategies, so that the results
might have been different under random rematching. However, as will be shown in the next section,
the results do not support this conjecture, as they are qualitatively in line with the baseline model,
and remain stable following the announcement of the additional rounds
11The ‘ring test’ is described for example in Griesinger and Livingston (1973) or Liebrand (1984);
see also Beckenkamp (1995) for an early application in Economics.
12Subjects were recruited using ORSEE by Greiner (2003). The experiment was programmed in
Pascal using RATimage by Abbink and Sadrieh (1995). The questionnaire and the ring test were
conducted using zTree by Fischbacher (2007). Sessions for treatment 444SUB were added during
the revision process in 2009. Unfortunately, in one session in treatment 444COM, only 15 subjects
showed up, so that we are missing one of the twelve independent observations in this treatment.
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just indifferent between working and shirking depends on the (belief about the)
decisions of the other two players in the group. Let X0 denote the reward that is
needed if an agent believes that both the other two agents in the group will shirk,
and let X1 and X2 be the corresponding values when expecting one, resp. none of
the others to shirk. Under a production function of complementarity, X0 is given as
40X0 − 90 = 20X0 ⇔ X0 = 4.5, i.e., the payoff from working must equal the payoff
from shirking under the belief that both the others shirk. Analogously, we find that
X1 = 3.6 and X2 = 90/35 ≈ 2.6.
This implies that the high-reward player in 345COM, receiving a reward of 5 per unit
produced, will always work, irrespective of his beliefs (since 5 > X0 > X1 > X2).
Anticipating this, the feasible beliefs for the medium-reward player are such that he
also has an optimal strategy to work (since 4 > X1 > X2). The only feasible belief
of the low-reward player is thus to expect both the others to work, in which case his
reward induces him to work as well (since 3 > X2). Hence the discriminating scheme
enables players to form exact beliefs about the other players’ decisions, although they
move simultaneously – and repeated elimination of strongly dominated strategies
leads to the unique Nash equilibrium of all players exerting effort.
Contrarily, this line of reasoning is not applicable when using the symmetric reward
scheme. Each player works only if he has the belief that at least one other player
exerts effort as well (since X0 > 4 > X1 > X2). This implies that in 444COM we
have two equilibria in pure strategies: Either all agents work, or all agents shirk
(with all work being the payoff- and risk-dominant equilibrium). Besides that, also
an equilibrium in mixed strategies exists in which the probability of shirking is
approximately 0.77 (and all players know that each of the other players will shirk
with this probability).
If we switch to the production function of substitutability, first consider that a naive
principal might be tempted to prefer this technology over the previous one. For any
given effort sum, the number of units produced is always equal or higher under sub-
stitutability than under complementarity. However, in 345SUB the discriminating
reward scheme is not optimal anymore, because the threshold-order is reversed un-
der a production function of substitutability (i.e., X0 ≈ 2.6, X1 = 3.6 and X2 = 4.5).
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Figure III.1: Player’s payoff function by type and decision
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In both treatments, the payoffs for the 5-type players from working dominate the payoffs from shirking, and so the
possibility of zero matched agents working can be eliminated for the other players. Now working dominates shirking
for the 4-type players under complementarity, while the opposite is true for the 3-type players under substitutability.
The remaining player in both treatments now maximizes her payoff by working. Thus the equilibria are derived
through repeated elimination of dominated strategies. The multiple pure equilibria of the egalitarian treatments are
revealed by the crossover of the payoff functions of the 4-type player under the corresponding production function.
Note that the gain from working can be seen to increase (diminish) under complementarity (substitutability).
Thus, the low-reward player shirks in equilibrium, while the other two players work;
and all players hold corresponding beliefs.
In 444SUB, an agent receives a higher payoff from exerting effort if no more than
two of the other agents exert effort (since X2 > 4 > X1 > X0). Hence there are
three asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies in which one of the agents shirks while
the other two agents exert effort. As in 444COM, an additional (symmetric) mixed
strategies equilibrium exists, in which the probability of shirking is approximately
.22.
The predictions above crucially depend on the assumption of subjects being self-
centered money-maximizers. By contrast, part of the literature (not only) in Behav-
ioral and Experimental Economics suggests that, beside pure money maximization,
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a non-negligible fraction of subjects is strongly motivated by other-regarding con-
siderations. In particular, subjects exhibit a basic desire for equity, including a
preference for equal treatment of equals (cp. Selten (1978), Mowday (1991), Roemer
(1996)), and a preference for equal payoff distributions (cp. Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)).
In the presence of equity considerations, any discriminating reward scheme comes at
some hidden costs which incentivize agents to shirk, even under an initially incentive-
inducing mechanism! Slight equity preferences13 are already enough to let the su-
periority of the discriminating rewards vanish in 345COM. If agents’ loss of utility
from another agent receiving a higher payoff than their own is as low as 1/6 of the
loss of utility of reducing their own payoff by the same amount, all-shirk becomes
the unique equilibrium in 345COM.14 Even worse, due to the recursive nature of
the equilibrium in Winter’s model, the sheer belief that one or both of the other
agents might have equity preferences can alone lead to a loss of efficiency — even
if all agents themselves are strictly self-centered money-maximizers. By contrast in
444COM, equity preferences provide additional incentives not to shirk. If a subject
expects the other two players in his group to work, shirking will reduce his payoff and
lead to a less equitable payoff distribution ((260, 170, 170) instead of (310, 310, 310));
which is something that (not only) an inequality-averse subject would never prefer.
Under substitutability, the effect of discrimination is rather robust to equity pref-
erences. In 345SUB, a smaller number of agents is exerting effort in equilibrium as
common envy increases. By contrast in 444SUB, the predictions crucially hinge on
the exact shape of the assumed equity preferences.
The behavioral predictions are summarized in Table IV.2. It lists the possible equi-
libria in pure strategies for self-centered subjects in the first row, and the equilibria
that might additionally emerge in the presence of equity-considerations in the second
13Throughout the paper, equity preferences are defined over payoffs rather than effort levels (cp.
Mohnen et al., forthcoming).
14The intuition behind this hypotheses can easily be seen if we reconceive above equilibrium
derivations using an extended utility function which incorporates equality preferences, e.g., the
function described in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Using their model, all-shirk is a possible equilibrium
in 345COM if α ≥ 1/3 and β = 0 – which is a very conservative estimate in comparison with
empirical estimations. Since the exact calculations are rather tedious and lengthy, they are available
from the authors upon request.
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row.
Table III.1: Treatment variations and equilibria
Treatment
345COM 345SUB 444COM 444SUB
Production Function: complementarity substitutability complementarity substitutability
Reward scheme: discriminating discriminating symmetric symmetric
Equilibria:
Self-centered (1,1,1) (0,1,1) (1,1,1) (0,1,1)
(0,0,0) (1,0,1)
(1,1,0)
Inequality-averse (0,0,0) (0,0,1) no (0,0,0)
(0,0,1) additional (0,0,1)
(0,1,1) equilibria (0,1,0)
(1,0,0)
(1,1,1)
III.C Experimental Results
In this section, first we show that workers’ behavior is indeed sensitive to the type of
production function they face in their joint project. The unequal treatment of equals
does not necessarily hamper full effort provision. We then present data on a change
in the reward scheme from a discriminating to an egalitarian one, which suggests
that equal treatment of equals does not necessarily promote full effort provision
within a team of agents. Nevertheless, as we finally show, signs of equity concerns
are present in our data.
III.C.1 Sensitivity to the Production Function
Figure III.2 shows mean effort levels over all rounds, conditional on players’ reward
type and treatment. Table III.2 provides summary statistics and test results.
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Figure III.2: Mean effort per treatment
Focussing on the discriminating reward scheme, overall effort levels are significantly
higher under a production function of complementarity than under a production
function of substitutability. 91.7% of all effort decisions in 345COM are to work,
compared to only 65.3% in treatment 345SUB. In 345COM, 6 out of 12 groups
exert full effort in all rounds (9/12 in all but one round), whereas the same is never
observed in 345SUB.
The difference in efficiency between 345COM and 345SUB is predicted to stem from
a difference in the behavior of the low-reward type in equilibrium. The average effort
level of the low-reward type in 345SUB is significantly lower than that of the other
two types (22.2% vs. 81.9% and 91.7%). It is also significantly lower than the effort
level of the same type in 345COM (22.2% vs. 88.9%). Also in the first round, the
number of low-reward players exerting effort is significantly higher in 345COM than
in 345SUB (16.7% vs. 75%).15
15Fisher’s exact test p = .012. Comparing the sums of effort per matching group in the first
round and the last round, we find no indication of a significant time trend (two-sided sign-rank
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Table III.2: Summary statistics and results of statistical comparisons
Treatment
345COM 345SUB 444COM 444SUB
A. Summary statistic:
Mean effort level round 1 88.9% 66.7% 78.8% 66.7%
Mean effort level rounds 1-5 91.7% 65.3% 72.2% 73.6%
SD round 1 .1641 .1421 .1681 .3482
SD rounds 1-5 .1580 .1421 .1681 .3482
B. Statistical comparison round 1
(p-values Fisher’s exact)
345COM .0230 .2080 .0230
345SUB .1960 .5990
444COM .1960
C. Statistical comparison rounds 1-5
(p-values, rank-sum test)
345COM .0004 .0649 .0309
345SUB .6850 .4410
444COM 1
D. Mean effort level per reward type:
low-reward type (3) 88.9% 22.3%
medium-reward type (4) 88.9% 81.9% 72.2% 73.6%
high-reward type (5) 97.2% 91.7%
E. Comparison across treatments within reward type
(p-values, rank-sum test)
low-reward type (3)
345COM .001
medium-reward type (4)
345COM .2058 .0260 .0127
345SUB .2526 .2508
444COM 1
high-reward type (5)
345COM .3202
F. Comparison within treatment across reward types
(p-values, sign-rank test)
low vs. medium (3 vs. 4) .3930 .0074
low vs. high (3 vs. 5) .0261 .0039
medium vs. high (4 vs. 5) .1577 .1248
NOTE: All reported p-values are two-sided. A: SD is given over the mean frequencies of work per matching group.
B: Effort level of each subject is one independent observation. C: Mean effort level of each matching group is
one independent observation. E: Mean effort level of each player is one independent observation. F: Players with
different reward types in one matching group are treated as depended observations.
The effort levels of the medium- and high-reward types in 345COM (88.9% and
97.2%) do not differ significantly from the corresponding levels in 345SUB. Overall,
when standard equilibrium predicts effort exertion, more than 80% do so. In the
test in 345COM p = .75; and in 345SUB p = .37). For further details compare the corresponding
time-series data of Figures C.1 and C.2 in the appendix.
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one case (low-reward type in 345SUB) in which the equilibrium strategy is to shirk,
almost 80% of the decisions are to shirk (cp. Table III.2-D).
Subjects’ individual beliefs are in line with these findings. In 345COM, medium-
and high-reward players believe that the low-reward player will work in 85% of all
cases, while in 345SUB the low-reward player is expected to work in only 33% of all
instances.16 93% of the decisions in 345COM and 77% of the decisions in 345SUB
are best responses to stated beliefs.
Result 1: In line with Winter’s model, treating equals unequally by using a discrim-
inating reward scheme leads to almost full efficiency under a production function of
complementarity — whereas the same reward scheme does not perform well under a
production function of substitutability.
III.C.2 Sensitivity to the Reward Scheme
Given a production function of complementarity and keeping the total cost of the
reward scheme constant, the mean efficiency in round one is lower under the sym-
metric reward scheme (78.9%) than under the discriminating one (88.9%). Over
the course of the experiment, the difference grows larger and becomes significant
(72.2% vs. 91.7%).17 On average, every reward type exerts more effort in the dis-
criminating than in the symmetric treatment. Only 3 out of 11 groups exert full
effort in all rounds, compared to 6/12 groups in 345COM (4/11 vs. 9/12 in all but
one round). Moreover, the standard deviation of group efficiencies is significantly
higher in 444COM than in 345COM.18
Our result suggests that equal treatment of equals does not necessarily promote
full effort provision within a team of agents. A potential reason for the observed
16Two-sided rank-sum test, medium-reward: p = .0004; high-reward: p = .0007
17Note that although the difference becomes significant over time, we find no significant time
trend in 444COM. Comparing the mean effort level of work per matching group between the first
and the last round reveals no significant difference (two-sided sign-rank test, p = .53; cp. also the
time-series data in Figure C.3).
18SD in 444COM (0.233) vs. SD in 345COM (0.158), Conover’s squared-ranks test: p = .0145.
Notice that the difference is not an artifact resulting from the high degree of efficiency in 345COM
(which puts a bound on the variance), as the group efficiencies in 345SUB, in which the overall
efficiency is similar to that in 444COM, show an even lower standard deviation of 0.068 (cp. Fig-
ure C.4).
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difference in efficiency between the symmetric and the discriminating scheme under
complementarity might be the introduction of the additional ‘all-shirk’-equilibrium
in treatment 444COM. Even though it is payoff- and risk-dominated by the ‘all-
work’-equilibrium, the multiplicity of equilibria introduces strategic uncertainty
(cp. van Huyck et al., 1990). Players formulating beliefs are uncertain whether
the other players in their group will work or shirk, which is visible in our data:
83% expect both other players to work in 345COM, whereas only 62% do so in
444COM.19 In 444COM, this translates into low efficiency rates and a high variance
of group efficiencies, suggesting that strategic considerations shaped by the reward
scheme are crucial, and outweigh possible equity preferences of the subjects.20
The asymmetry of the reward scheme facilitates coordination among the agents
under a production of complementarity. In case of the discriminating reward scheme,
subjects can anticipate that the high-reward player will exert effort, which in turn
incentivizes the medium- and low-reward players to do so as well. On the other hand,
the identical rewards under the symmetric scheme make it hard for the subjects to
form beliefs about the action of the other players, so that they are all in the dark.
Also under a production function of substitutability, the symmetric reward scheme
yields a higher degree of strategic uncertainty than the discriminating reward scheme.
This is reflected by our data. In 40% of the rounds, at least one team member changes
its effort level in 444SUB (32% in 345SUB). The observed standard deviation of
group efficiencies is significantly higher in 444SUB than in 345SUB.21 However, all
of the pure equilibria in 444SUB require exactly two out of three agents to exert
effort, which is the same as in the unique equilibrium in 345SUB. Therefore, the
lack of coordination should not decrease efficiency. In fact, in both treatments we
observe exactly two-thirds of the subjects exerting effort in the first round. The
proportion remains fairly stable in 345SUB throughout the experiment (65.3%) and
19two-sided rank-sum test, p = .0979
20Note that strategic uncertainty might also be present in 345COM, because ‘all-work’ and ‘all-
shirk’ are potential equilibria once we allow for equity considerations. Yet, we observe almost full
efficiency in this treatment. One might consider that the result may be driven by a difference in the
subject population between treatments. However, a comparisons of the corresponding results of the
social-value orientation test reveals no significant differences between treatments (Kruskal-Wallis
test, p = .19).
21SD in 444SUB (0.215) vs. SD in 345SUB (0.068), Conover’s squared-ranks test: p = .0011
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increases slightly in 444SUB (73.6%).22
Result 2: Treating equals equally is neither a necessary nor a sufficient prerequisite
for eliciting high performance in teams. Asymmetry facilitates coordination and
increases efficiency under a production function of complementarity. The possible
benefit of a discriminating reward scheme on efficiency levels strongly interacts with
the production function — which is again in line with Winter’s model.
III.C.3 Equity Concerns
Although we saw above that unequal rewards can potentially increase productivity,
let us point out that this is not to say that equity considerations are absent in
our experiment. For example, the average rate of effort provision over all rounds
in 345COM is significantly different between the low- and the high-reward type
(88.9% vs. 97.2%). This might reflect a slight reluctance of the low-reward players
to work because the others then earn more than himself. Yet, in 5/8 instances where
the low-reward player shirks, the behavior might also be explained by self-centered
preferences, because subjects play a best response given their individual belief (in
total, 93% of the decisions in 345COM are best responses to the stated beliefs).
Speaking of beliefs, in 345COM also the beliefs of medium- and high-reward players
about the low-reward player’s decision in the first round reveal some influence of
equity concerns, because 42% (wrongly) expect him to shirk.
Also in 444COM, we observe signs of equity concerns. Players are very likely to
exert effort if they expect both other players to work as well ( in this situation 89%
of the decisions were to work). This might just be playing the best reply on their
stated belief (in total, 79% of the decisions in 444COM are best responses to the
stated beliefs). But it might also be because they do not want to increase the payoff
inequality in their group by shirking.
Exploring the same situation in 444SUB, we can actually distinguish between the two
22The slight increase may be due to subjects trying to coordinate on one of the pure equilibria
in the first round, but later approaching the symmetric mixed equilibrium through learning. Nev-
ertheless, no significant time trend is observed in 444SUB. Comparing the mean effort level per
matching group between the first and the last round reveals no significant difference (two-sided
sign-rank test, p = .87; cp. also the time-series data in Figure ??). As noted earlier, the same holds
true for 345SUB.
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reasons because now they do not coincide. Here, if a player expects both the others
to work, the best reply would be to shirk. Nonetheless, equity concerns might make
him want to work so that players’ payoffs are equitable. What we observe is that in
this case only 18% of the decisions are a best reply to the stated beliefs (in the other
cases in 444SUB, the rate is actually 55%) — which again is indicative of equity
concerns. However, it is important to note that the discrepancy between beliefs and
behavior could also result from rational selfish money-maximizing preferences. In
the mixed equilibrium, agents exert effort with high probability. Thus, when asked
for a point belief, expecting others to exert effort becomes optimal, which leads to
behavior similar to what we observe.
Finally, the data from the social-value orientation test indicate that subjects have
a general preference for equitable outcomes, because in all treatments the value-
orientations do differ significantly from being strictly self-centered (two-sided rank-
sum test, 345COM: p ≤ .001; 345SUB: p ≤ .001; 444COM: p ≤ .001; 444SUB:
p ≤ .001).
III.D Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the interaction in teams. More specifically, we experimen-
tally explored whether workers’ behavior is sensitive to the externalities given by
the production technology, and whether a major incentive advantage exists when
discriminating among perfectly identical agents. In our experiment, three work-
ers simultaneously decide on their individual provision of costly effort to a joint
project. Treatments differ in the shape of the project’s production technology and
of the reward scheme. Under a production technology of complementarity, the use
of a symmetric reward scheme elicits substantially lower efforts and efficiency than
a cost-equivalent discriminating reward scheme. The same discriminating reward
scheme underperforms when it is utilized under a production function of substi-
tutability.
Our findings have important implications for the design of organizations in practice.
First, they clearly point to the relevance of the production function for organization
Chapter III - Treating Equals Unequally - Incentives in Teams 42
construction – a factor which has so far received little attention in the literature.23
Designing (production) tasks in a way that makes workers’ efforts complements
rather than substitutes may lead to a major cost advantage. Insofar as peer pressure
constitutes a complementarity in effort exertion, the strengthening of social ties
amongst the workforce alone might have a strong impact on productivity.
Second, and closely related, is our finding that unequal treatment of equals does
not necessarily hamper efficiency. Whenever the organizational technology is one
of complementarity, i.e., whenever the impact of a worker’s input increases in the
size of the others’ input, the usage of a discriminating reward scheme might be po-
tentially efficiency-enhancing. The main reason for this is that asymmetric rewards
facilitate coordination, because workers can anticipate that those who have high
stakes at hand will certainly exert effort – which in turn incentivizes the other work-
ers to exert effort as well. Consider that discrimination must not necessarily be in
monetary terms, but might also take the form of hierarchies. While a vast body of
literature in personnel economics already promotes the implementation of hierarchies
(e.g., Lazear and Rosen (1981)), our results suggest that hierarchies might enhance
performance despite the absence of the existing literature’s usual assumptions of
monitoring or authority relations.
In this regard, we more generally contribute to the ongoing research on behavioral
phenomena in organizations. As James Konow (2000) puts it: “Many of the successes
of economics can probably be attributed to its pushing the assumption of self-interest
to the extreme. To proceed further, however, it may be necessary to incorporate richer
behavioral assumptions that include fairness and other moral standards.” (Konow
(2000), p. 1089). While we agree in principle, it should be added that it is addi-
tionally necessary to identify the situations in which behavior is in line with the
classical model – which is ultimately an empirical question. Only then can we really
understand how to model the richer behavioral assumptions in a way to advance
Economics.
The implications of our results can be extended beyond the labor context to addi-
23The role of externalities between coworkers was studies by Gould and Winter (2009), who show
that professional baseball players react to the technology in a way consistent with a related model
to the one we study.
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tional environments in which unequal treatment of equal is shown to be efficient.
Relevant applications include differential tax rates (Atkinson & Stiglitz, 1976) and
various trade contexts in which a ’divide and conquer’ strategy maximizes gains
(see Segal, 2003, and references therein). Thus, equity preferences may hinder the
dynamics assumed in different domains. Our paper presents a step forward in under-
standing the boundaries of equity considerations and their potential implications.
The results in this paper should not be taken as arguments against the importance of
fairness considerations in general. For instance, they might be partially explainable
by models incorporating social efficiency (e.g. Charness & Rabin, 2002). Still, our
findings suggest that equal treatment of equals is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
prerequisite for eliciting high performance in teams. Yet the relative importance of
equity considerations is likely to depend on the exact details of the organizational
setting and framework. In this paper, we presented experimental evidence for some
of these settings, and stressed the interaction between production technologies and
reward schemes. Future research could try to exacerbate the differences in payoffs
in order to estimate some kind of metric for the strength of inequity preferences
in our setting (we thank an anonymous referee for making this suggestion). Other
interesting variations of the organizational settings include a change in the timing of
effort choices, the introduction of heterogeneity among the workforce or the use of
‘symbolic’ instead of monetary differentiation. Extending our simple design allows
for studying these and other interesting aspects in the future.
Chapter IV
Experimental Investigation of Cyclic Duopoly Games
IV.A Introduction
Several studies have demonstrated that the concept of mixed Nash equilibrium fails
to explain observed behavior in experiments (e.g., Brown & Rosenthal, 1990, Erev
& Roth, 1998, and Avrahami, Kareev & Güth, 2005). In a recent paper by Selten &
Chmura (2008) on completely mixed 2× 2 games played by small populations with
random matching over 200 rounds, several behavioral stationary concepts beat the
Nash equilibrium in predicting subjects’ behavior. In that study the two behavioral
concepts of impulse-balance equilibrium and payoff-sampling equilibrium proved to
be successful but hard to differentiate.
The main goal of this paper is to examine the results from Selten & Chmura in a
different environment. We therefore compare the predictive success of Nash equi-
librium, impulse-balance equilibrium and payoff-sampling equilibrium in two cyclic
games.
The notion of a cyclic game has been introduced by Selten and Wooders (2001).
Cyclic games can be applied to simplified recurring situations with intertemporal
competition. Similar situations are investigated by overlapping generations models
(starting with Diamond 1965), but on the basis of market theory rather than game
theory. In our study we applied the concept of a cyclic game to the market entry
situation in a duopoly.
In our duopoly games exactly one potential entrant in each period can decide whether
44
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he wants to enter the market or not. If he enters he stays in the market for exactly
two periods and then exits. Imagine that this market is very narrow. A firm makes
a negative profit if it has to share the market with another firm in both periods. A
positive profit can be obtained if the firm is the only supplier in at least one of the
two periods.
In these games it is always profitable to enter an empty market. However, a potential
entrant who faces an occupied market in period t has to think about the consequences
of entering the market. If he enters, the following potential entrant in period t + 1
will also face an occupied market and will find himself in the same decision problem.
As we shall see this leads, for each of the three stationary concepts, to a different
symmetric mixed equilibrium, in which every player facing an occupied market enters
with the same probability.
We will investigate two different cyclic games, which share two features with the
2 × 2 games investigated by Selten & Chmura (2008): First, two types of players
compete against each other and, second, both player types have two possible actions
to choose from. However, the investigated cyclic games differ by three properties
from the 2 × 2 games from Selten & Chmura (2008): First, in our cyclic games
the payoffs of both players are symmetric, while in Selten & Chmura (2008) they
were not. Second, players in cyclic games have perfect information in the sense
that each information set consists of only one node. In cyclic games the players
act sequentially in contrast to the 2× 2 games with simultaneous decisions. Third,
while in the mentioned 2× 2 games only mixed equilibria existed there are two pure
strategy equilibria in the cyclic duopoly games.
Because of the similarities and the differences we think that the cyclic game is a
good starting point to observe the concepts investigated by Selten & Chmura in a
different environment and a good way to identify potential reasons for alternative
results.
Our results confirm the superior predictive power of impulse-balance equilibrium
and payoff-sampling equilibrium in comparison to Nash equilibrium. Overall, both
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behavioral concepts perform significantly better than Nash equilibrium does. Our
results differ from Selten & Chmura (2008) regarding the equality of impulse-balance
equilibrium and payoff-sampling equilibrium: In our study payoff-sampling equilib-
rium performs significantly better than impulse-balance equilibrium does. In our
opinion this disadvantage of impulse-balance equilibrium in comparison to the men-
tioned 2× 2 games is caused by the sequential move structure of the cyclic game.
As mentioned before, our experimental setup also permits asymmetric equilibria in
which one of the two players, say player one, always enters and the other player
never enters. In fact the data reveal a significant tendency towards convergence to
pure strategies over time. This finding sheds some doubt on the comparison of the
three stationary concepts in the long run.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we will describe and
explain the cyclic oligopoly game in more detail. Afterwards the three stationary
concepts are introduced, applied to the games and their predictions are derived. In
section 4 the experimental procedure is described and subsequently, section 5 gives
our results. Finally, section 6 summarizes and concludes this paper.
IV.B The cyclic game
A cyclic game may be looked upon as a condensed description of an infinite game. In
the following we shall describe the infinite game structure underlying our experiment.
The game runs over periods t = 1, 2, ... In each period t a potential entrant t has
to decide whether he enters the market or not in period t. If he enters he stays in
the market for periods t and t + 1 and exits then. A potential entrant t may face
an empty market, which is always true for t=1. For t = 2, 3, ... the market is empty
at period t if the potential entrant t − 1 did not enter the market. The market is
occupied for t with t = 2, 3, .. if the potential entrant t− 1 did enter the market.
The concept of a cyclic game permits a condensed description of game situations like
the one investigated in our experiment. In our case, the cyclic game has only two
players. These two players are roles of the potential entrants. The odd-numbered
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members of an independent subject group are in the role of player 1 and the even-
numbered are in the role of player 2.
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Figure IV.1: Structure of the cyclic duopoly game
Figure IV.1 illustrates the structure of the cyclic duopoly game as introduced by
Selten & Wooders (2001). The figure has the structure of a directed graph with 3
types of nodes and additional information regarding player and payoff. Each point
describes a situation of either player 1 or player 2. At a decision point a player has
to decide between two alternatives in our case IN or OUT. Here IN means entering
and OUT means not entering. At a payoff point or an exit and payoff point, the
payoff of the concerning player is shown in rectangular brackets above this point.
The arrows show the direction in which the game moves from one situation to the
next.
At the upper right corner player 1 can decide between IN and OUT in the situation
of an empty market. In the case OUT he receives a payoff of W at a payoff and exit
point. If he chooses IN he receives a payoff of U in this period and the game moves
to a decision point of player 2. If player 2 then chooses OUT first, a payoff and exit
point is reached, at which player 2 receives W and then a payoff and exit point of
player 1, where he receives U. From there the game moves back to the upper right
corner. The other parts of the figure are to be understood in the same way.
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In our cyclic oligopoly game U is the payoff for a period in which the entrant is
alone in the market, V is the payoff for a period in which the entrant is not alone in
the market, and W is the payoff for two periods if the market is not entered. The
parameters U , V andW were chosen in such a way that the condition U+V > W >
2V is satisfied and thus implies U > V . Therefore entering an empty market always
leads to a higher payoff than not entering an empty market. In our experiments we
applied two different sets of the parameters U, V and W , which are given in table
IV.1.
U V W
Game A 10 2 5
Game B 10 3 9
Table IV.1: Parameter for U, V and W in Game A and Game B
These different parameter sets lead to different equilibria and provide different at-
tractiveness for not entering an occupied market.1 In Game B the payoff for not
entering the market is higher than in Game A; therefore it should lead to a smaller
entry rate in Game B compared to the one in Game A.
IV.C Three stationary concepts for the cyclic game
We shall look at three stationary concepts: Nash equilibrium, impulse-balance equi-
librium and payoff-sampling equilibrium. First, we will derive the Nash equilibria
for the two games. Then we will explain the basic ideas behind the two behavioral
concepts, impulse-balance equilibrium and payoff-sampling equilibrium.
As has been shown in Selten and Wooders (2001) the cyclic game has three Nash
equilibria. A symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium and two pure-strategy equilib-
ria. In the symmetric mixed equilibrium the probability α for entering if the market
is occupied is as follows:
1In addition we chose the parameters to ensure that the distances between the resulting equi-
libria are big enough to determine the concept with the best fit to the data.
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α =
U + V −W
U − V
In Game A this leads to the probability of entering the occupied market of α = 0.875
and in Game B to the probability of α = 0.571. If the market is empty the probability
of entering is always one. This is also true for the two pure equilibria. However,
there the probabilities α1 and α2 are
α1 = 1 and α2 = 0
in the first pure-strategy equilibrium and
α1 = 0 and α2 = 1
in the second pure-strategy equilibrium.
We now turn our attention to the impulse-balance equilibrium. Impulse-balance
equilibrium is based on the idea of learning direction theory (Selten & Buchta, 1999),
which looks at probabilities of decisions as behavioral tendencies. Selten and Buchta
explain the concept by the example of a marksman aiming at a trunk: "If he misses
the trunk to the right, he will shift the position of the bow to the left and if he misses
the trunk to the left he will shift the position of the bow to the right. The marksman
looks at his experience from the last trial and adjusts his behavior [...]." (p. 86 Selten
& Buchta, 1999)
The concept of impulse-balance equilibrium (Selten, Abbink & Cox, 2005, and Sel-
ten & Chmura, 2008) models these adjustments with impulses received after the
realization of payoffs. Suppose that the first of two strategies has been chosen in a
period and this strategy was not the best reply to the strategy played by the other
player. Then the player receives an impulse towards the second strategy. This im-
pulse is the difference between the payoff the player could have received for his best
reply minus the payoff actually received given the strategy used by the other player
in this period. The player does not receive an impulse if his strategy was a best
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reply against the strategy used by the other player.
To incorporate loss aversion, the impulses are not calculated with the original pay-
offs but with transformed ones. In games with two strategies and a mixed Nash
equilibrium each strategy has a minimal payoff and the maximum of the two min-
imal payoffs is called the pure strategy maximin. This pure strategy maximin is
the maximal payoff a player can obtain for sure in every round and it forms a nat-
ural aspiration level. Amounts below this aspiration level are perceived as losses
and amounts above this aspiration level are perceived as gains. In the case of our
cyclic games the payoff for not entering a market W forms this aspiration level. In
line with prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) losses are counted double in
comparison to gains.2 Thus, gains (the part above W ) are cut into half for the com-
putation of impulses. Figure V.1 illustrates this transformation for the investigated
cyclic oligopoly games.
The original payoffs The transformed payoffs
Entrant t+ 1 Entrant t+ 1
IN OUT IN OUT
IN 2V V +U IN 2V V+U−W
2
+W⇒
OUT W W OUT W W
Figure IV.2: Entrant t’s original and transformed payoffs for an occupied market,
assuming that U + V > W > 2V is fulfilled.
Impulse-balance equilibrium is reached at a point in which the expected impulses in
both directions are equal. Let α be the probability of entering an occupied market at
impulse-balance equilibrium. If the potential entrant enters the market he receives
2We consider impulse-balance equilibrium as a concept, which is free of parameters. Keeping
the loss-aversion fixed to 2 allows impulse-balance equilibrium to be used for predictions in different
games without estimating a parameter. This is a big advantage over parametric concepts for which
the parameter must be adjusted, to the whole population or parts of it, after the behavior has
been observed. However, one might want to use impulse-balance equilibrium to organize the data
ex-post and therefore it might be appropriate to estimate the loss-aversion directly from the data.
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no impulse if the next player does not enter, since in this case entering proved to
be the best choice, ex-post. If the other player also enters he receives an impulse of
W − 2V towards OUT. Since α is both players’ probability for entering, he receives
an impulse for OUT with probability α2.
We now consider the case that the player does not enter. In this case he does not
receive any feedback. Of course he knows that the next player will enter the market
since it is a dominant strategy, but this is not the relevant feedback impulse-balance
equilibrium relies on. In the original concept of impulse-balance equilibrium impulses
are formed with players deciding simultaneously. The sequential move structure of
the cyclic game leads to the problem that the next player can condition his decision
on the previous player’s decision and thus an ex-post reflection keeping the matched
player’s decision fixed is impossible. The potential entrant is interested in what the
next player would hypothetically have done if he, the potential entrant, had entered
the market. Therefore he assumes that the next player finds himself in the same
situation of an occupied market as he himself did and performs the same action as
he did in this case.
For the proportion of cases in which the potential entrant did not enter and the
following player would not have entered given that the potential entrant had entered,
he receives an impulse of (W + V+U−W
2
)−W = V+U−W
2
towards IN. This happens
with probability (1− α)2. Figure IV.3 illustrates the possible impulses.
At equilibrium the mathematical expectation of impulses in the direction of not
entering is equal to the one towards entering. This is expressed by the following
impulse-balance equation:
α2(W − 2V ) = (1− α)2V + U −W
2
Thus, the probability of entering an occupied market can be stated as:
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Figure IV.3: Impulses in the direction of the other strategy
α = 1−
√
2(W − 2V )√
V + U −W +√2(W − 2V )
At equilibrium a player enters an occupied market with probability α = 0.622 in
Game A and with α = 0.449 in Game B. In the case of a free market, impulse-
balance leads to the same dominant strategy IN as the Nash equilibrium does. In
addition the pure-strategy Nash equilibria are also impulse-balance equilibria, since
in a pure strategy equilibrium nobody receives any impulse and therefore does not
change his strategy.
The last stationary concept we will report on is the payoff-sampling equilibrium.
Osborne & Rubinstein (1998) introduced this concept. The concept assumes that a
player acts in accordance with previous experiences. Therefore he accesses experi-
ence in his memory made for each possible action. Thereby the number of recalled
experiences is limited and the number of sampled experiences can be interpreted
as the intensity used to search through the memory.3 In addition, the selection of
experiences is done randomly. The order how they come to mind is haphazard and
not deterministic. Afterwards the player chooses the action, which has the highest
3Osborne & Rubinstein (1998) interpret the sample size as the detailedness of the players’
reasoning process or as the players’ sophistication.
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outcome given the sampled experiences. This procedure describes behavioral pat-
terns exhibited by subjects who do not make use of information about the actions
and payoffs of their opponents.
Applied to our cyclic games this means that the player draws two samples of equal
sizes n from previous periods, one for the strategy IN and one for the strategy OUT.
He then forms the payoff sums in the two samples and compares them and plays
the strategy with the highest payoff sum. If both payoff sums are equal he flips a
coin and thus chooses a pure strategy with probability 1
2
. This rule is not part of
the original concept; Osborne & Rubinstein (1998) did not discuss the case of equal
payoffs.
The probability α for entering in the cyclic games is determined as follows. Consider
a sample of n cases in which the player has played IN. Let k be the number of cases
in this sample in which the next player entered. Let Sk be the payoff sum of the
sample. Then we have
Sk = (V + U)(n− k) + 2V k.
This payoff sum Sk must be compared to the payoff sum W · n obtained for not
entering n times. The player does not enter if the payoff sum difference
Dk = Wn− Sk = (U − V )k − (V + U −W )n
is positive. In the case Dk = 0 the probability of not entering is 12 . The conditional
probability of not entering if there are k cases of next players entering in the sample
for IN is as follows
η(n, k) =

0 for (V + U −W )n > (U − V )k
1
2
for (V + U −W )n = (U − V )k
1 for (V + U −W )n < (U − V )k
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With the help of this notation we now can derive an equation for the entry probability
α:
α = max
[
1−
n∑
k=0
η(n, k)
(
n
k
)
αk, 0
]
The sum on the right-hand side of this equation is the total probability of not
entering. The probability of not entering if there are exactly k cases with next
players entering in the sample for IN is η(n, k) times the binomial probability for k
out of n players entering.
Figure IV.4 gives the functions of α for both cyclic games and shows that in both
games the equation for α has exactly one solution in 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
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Figure IV.4: Probability α for the payoff-sampling equilibrium in Game A (left) and
Game B (right).
It is not immediately clear whether a strict pure-strategy equilibrium can be con-
sidered a payoff-sampling equilibrium. If really always only the equilibrium strategy
has been played in the past, there is no sample for the other strategy. On the other
hand, a learning process applying the idea of payoff-sampling may very well converge
towards the pure-strategy equilibria.
Table IV.2 gives the equilibria of the different concepts for both games.4 In the
following we will use this probabilities as predictions for the average entry rates.
4The probabilities for payoff-sampling equilibrium are already given for the optimal sample size
as determined in section IV.E.1
Chapter IV - Experimental Investigation of Cyclic Duopoly Games 55
Game A Game B
Nash equilibrium 0.875 0.571
Impulse-balance equilibrium 0.622 0.449
Payoff-sampling equilibrium 0.778 0.424
Table IV.2: Predicted probabilities for entering an occupied market by the three
different concepts, for even and uneven players
IV.D Experimental design
The experiments were carried out in 2005 (Game A) and 2008 (Game B) at the
Laboratory for Experimental Economics of the University of Bonn (BonnEconLab).
Seven sessions were conducted, in two sessions there were 24 participants, in four
sessions there were 18 participants and in one session only twelve. In each session
subjects were subdivided into independent matching groups of six. Thus we gathered
a total of 22 independent observations with 11 observations per game.
Altogehter 132 subjects participated in our experiment. The participants, all stu-
dents, were invited via the ORSEE5 database of the laboratory. The participants
came from different faculties with most of them majoring in economics (around 37%)
and law (around 21%).
The theoretical game situation described above extends over an infinite number of
time periods. However, in an experiment one cannot play for infinite time. There-
fore, our experiments run over 200 rounds. The calculation of somebody’s payoff,
who enters in the last period, requires the decision of a potential entrant in the next
period. This creates an "end-problem". We solved this problem by substituting a
randomly-chosen decision of an earlier entrant facing an occupied market for the
decision in the next round.
Although the experiment lasted over 200 rounds each subject had to make only 100
decisions. This is due to the fact that only one half of the subjects decided in uneven
rounds and the other half in even rounds.
5see Greiner (2004).
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At the beginning of the experiment the participants were briefed with written in-
structions,6 which were read out to them. They were informed about the duration
of the experiment and that one half would decide in uneven and the other in even
rounds. Furthermore they were told that before each decision each subject would be
randomly matched to a market. The participants did not know that they were sub-
divided into independent subject groups of six. Therefore they were led to believe
that there were more markets to which they could be assigned. After the introduc-
tion the participants were separated into cabins with computer terminals and the
experiment was started.7
On the screens8 participants first received the current status of the matched market,
i.e., if the market was free or occupied. Given the status of the market they were
asked whether they wanted to enter this market or not. After their decision and the
decision of the next matched player they were shown their payoff for the two rounds.
If they entered the market they additionally received the information whether the
next matched player had entered the market or not. If they had not entered the
market this information was not provided.
The payoffs in the game were given in the fictitious currency Taler and at the end of
the game transferred into Euro with an exchange rate of 1 Taler equals 1 EuroCent.
In addition to the cumulated payoffs subjects received a show-up fee of 5 Euro. To
guarantee anonymity of the decisions participants were separately payed. Overall
one session lasted about one hour and the payoffs were between 10 and 23 Euros.
IV.E The experimental results
The three concepts serve as predictions for the frequencies for entering a free market
and an occupied market. In the following we do not assume that the theories can
predict the behavior of a single player, but we will compare the predictive power of
the three concepts for the average behavior in independent subject groups. For each
6A translated version of the instructions can be found in the Appendix.
7The experiment was programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
8Screenshots are shown in the Appendix.
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independent subject group i we will use the quadratic distance
Qi = (α− fi)2
between the theoretical probabilities α and the observed mean relative frequency fi
as the measure of predictive success. The overall predictive success is measured by
the mean of all theses quadratic distances over the 22 subject groups.
Q =
1
22
22∑
i=1
Qi
In the following we will first search for the sample size n of the payoff-sampling
equilibrium with the best fit to the data. Then we will compare the predictive
success of the three theories. We will compare the overall predictive success and
whether this success changes over time. Afterwards we will analyze tendencies of
convergences towards the pure-strategy equilibria.
IV.E.1 Comparison of Sample Sizes for Payoff-sampling
Equilibrium
In the study by Selten and Chmura (2008) the sample size 6 yielded the best fit for
the data in the twelve 2 × 2 games. However, it is not clear whether this sample
size would lead to the predictions with the best fit to the data in our cyclical game.
Therefore, we compared the predictive success of different sample sizes. We searched
for one sample size, which minimizes the quadratic distance over both games.
Figure IV.5 shows the quadratic distances for the payoff-sampling equilibrium with
the sample sizes n=2,...,10. It can be seen that, as in Selten & Chmura (2008), the
sample size 6 yields the best fit to the data. Therefore we will base our comparison
of the stationary concepts on the payoff-sampling with the sample size of 6.9
9Estimating the best-fitting parameter for each game seperately leads to an optimal sample size
of n = 5 for Game A and to an optimal sample size of n = 9 for Game B. Table 1 in the Appendix
gives the quadratic distances for each game and for each sample size.
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Figure IV.5: Mean quadratic distance for different sample sizes
IV.E.2 Predictive Power of the three Concepts
We will start with the comparison of the relative frequencies obtained in our exper-
iment with the predictions of the three concepts in the case of an empty market.
In this case all three concepts predict a frequency of 1 for entry. In nine of the 22
observations this prediction is correct and all potential entrants join the markets
when they are empty. In the other 13 observations the relative frequencies for en-
try are very high, too. The smallest entry rate is 0.9506. It is not surprising that
the participants realize that the strategy of not entering the market is dominated
in this case by the strategy of entering the market. The numerical values for all
observations are shown in Table 3 in the Appendix.
If the market is occupied, entry is no longer the dominant strategy and different
frequencies of entering are observed. In Game A the mean frequency of entering an
occupied market is 0.7415 and in Game B it is 0.4224. In the case of an occupied
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market the three stationary concepts predict different relative frequencies of entry.
Therefore they perform differently in describing the experimental data. To measure
the predictive power of each concept we use the mean quadratic distance. Figure
IV.6 gives the mean quadratic distances to the data for each of the three stationary
concepts in both games.
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Figure IV.6: Quadratic distances in occupied markets
Obviously payoff-sampling equilibrium has the highest predictive success: In both
games, payoff-sampling equilibrium has the smallest mean quadratic distance.
Impulse-balance equilibrium, has in both games, the second highest quadratic dis-
tance and Nash equilibrium always has the highest quadratic distance. Table 4 in
the Appendix shows the observed frequencies and the quadratic distances of the
three concepts for each observation in both games.
In 15 of the 22 observations the quadratic distance to payoff-sampling equilibrium
is the smallest, in five observations the quadratic distance to impulse-balance equi-
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librium is the smallest and in two observations the quadratic distance to the Nash
equilibrium is the smallest. In addition to this, the quadratic distance to the Nash
equilibrium in three observations is smaller than the quadratic distance to the
impulse-balance equilibrium, but nevertheless larger than the quadratic distances
to the payoff-sampling equilibrium. In 17 out of 22 observations the quadratic dis-
tance to the Nash equilibrium is the largest of all three concepts. Taking the mean
quadratic distance over both games we receive a clear order of predictive success:
Payoff-sampling performs the best (0.0056), impulse-balance equilibrium performs
second-best (0.0092) and Nash equilibrium has the worst performance (0.0248).
Testing the quadratic distances of the three concepts with the two-sided Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, we obtain the results given in Table IV.3. The significances are
in favor of the row concept. The first row in each cell shows the results only if the
predictive power in Game A is compared, the second row only if the predictive power
in Game B is compared and the third row if the predictive power over both games
is compared.
Nash
Equilibrium
Impulse-balance
equilibrium
Payoff
-sampling
equilibrium
1%
2.5%
1%
5%
n.s.
5%
Impulse-
balance
equilibrium
n.s.
1%
1%
-
Table IV.3: p-values of the two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test with the quadratic
distances to the data in favor of the row concept. The first row gives the comparison
for Game A, the second row for Game B and the last row over both games.
No statistically significant difference between the predictive power of the impulse-
balance equilibrium and the Nash equilibrium could be observed for Game A. But
for Game B and the overall comparison, impulse-balance equilibrium fits the data
significantly better than the Nash equilibrium does. Payoff-sampling equilibrium
has a significantly higher predictive success than Nash equilibrium over all games
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and in each of the two games. The comparison between payoff-sampling equilibrium
and impulse-balance equilibrium is not statistically significant in the case of Game
B. In case of Game A and for the overall comparison, payoff-sampling equilibrium
has a significantly higher predictive success than impulse-balance equilibrium.
But how sensitive is this order with respect to the sample size of payoff-sampling
equilibrium? The comparison of payoff-sampling equilibrium and Nash equilibrium
is very robust across different sample sizes. Thus, for each sample size 10 ≥ n > 2,
payoff-sampling equilibrium performs significantly better than Nash equilibrium in
the overall comparison and in Game A. In Game B, payoff-sampling equilibrium
performs significantly better than Nash equilibrium for all sample sizes except for
n = 2, n = 5 and n = 10.
In Game A, the comparison of payoff-sampling equilibrium with impulse-balance
equilibrium is robust with respect to the sample size: for each sample size 10 ≥
n > 2 payoff-sampling equilibrium performs significantly better than impulse bal-
ance equilibrium. In Game B, all comparisons with impulse-balance equilibrium for
10 ≥ n > 2 are insignificant.10 Taking both games into account, payoff-sampling
equilibrium has a significant higher predictive success than impulse-balance equilib-
rium for 1
3
of the investigated sample sizes, namely n = 3, n = 6, and n = 9. The
other investigated sample sizes do not yield significant differences.11
IV.E.3 Changes over Time
Up to here we have analyzed the data on an aggregated basis and could elicit an
order for the predictive success for 200 periods. We now investigate whether this
order changes over time. In our experiment players had to decide whether to enter
or not to enter the market 100 times. Thus, our analyses are limited to these 100
decisions. We compare the first 50 decisions with the second 50 decisions. On
10For n=2 impulse-balance equilibrium performs always significantly better than payoff-sampling
equilibrium and in Game B even Nash equilibrium performs significantly better than payoff-
sampling with n = 2.
11The results for all comparisons with the Wilcoxon signed-rank test are given in table 2 in the
Appendix.
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average, in Game A entry rates for an occupied market are rather stable over time
(first half: 73%; second half: 74%), while they drop in Game B over time (first half:
46%; second half: 37%). Figure IV.7 gives the mean quadratic distance of the three
theories to the observed frequency of entering the market for the first 50 decisions,
for the second 50 decisions, and for all 100 decisions.
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Figure IV.7: Quadratic distances to the data for the first 50 decisions, the second
50 decisions, and overall
The mean quadratic distance of all three concepts increases over time. The increase
of the quadratic distance over time of impulse-balance equilibrium and the payoff-
sampling equilibrium is not significant, neither for one of the two games nor for all
22 observations (Wilcoxon signed-rank test). The declined predictive success over
time of the Nash equilibrium is neither significant over all games and in Game A,12
but in Game B it is weakly significant (p=0.1, two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
12In fact, the quadratic distance of the Nash equilibrium decreases over time in Game A, but it
is only a minor effect and not statically robust.
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The increased quadratic distances of the three stationary concepts to the experi-
mental data is at least partly caused by an inertia. The number of strategy changes
between periods decreases over time. For the first 50 decisions in Game A 25.97%
(Game B 22.67%) of the chosen action differed from the round before. In the second
50 decisions this fraction dropped in Game A to 19.18% (Game B 13.39%). There
is only one independent observation group in Game A and two in Game B in which
the number of strategy changes increases over time. Overall, there are significantly
less changes of actions in the second half of the game (p < 0.01, two-sided Wilcoxon
signed-rank test).
We now turn our attention to the comparison between the three concepts over time.
Table IV.4 shows the two-sided significances of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test in
favor of the row concept. The first value in a cell is the level of significance in the
first 50 decisions and the second value is the level of significance in the second 50
decisions.
Nash
equilibrium
Impulse
balance
equilibrium
Payoff-sampling
equilibrium
0.005
0.001
n.s.
0.05
Impulse-balance
equilibrium
0.025
0.01 -
Table IV.4: p-values of the two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test with the quadratic
distances of the data in rounds 1-50 (top) and rounds 51-100 (bottom) in favor of
the row concept
Comparing the behavioral concepts with the Nash equilibrium, the significance levels
are a little bit weaker in the first 50 decisions than in the second, but tendencies
are the same as in the overall comparison. The prediction of the Nash equilibrium
has a significantly weaker predictive success than the predictions of impulse-balance
equilibrium and of the payoff-sampling equilibrium. No significant difference can be
found for the comparison of the predictive success of impulse-balance equilibrium
and payoff-sampling equilibrium for the first 50 rounds. Over time the difference
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between higher predictive success of the payoff-sampling equilibrium in comparison
to the one of impulse-balance equilibrium becomes significant.
IV.E.4 Convergence to Pure Strategies?
Altogether, 7 out of 66 subjects in Game A and 6 out of 66 subjects in Game B
always entered the market. If only the last 50 decisions are analyzed, the number of
participants who always entered the market increases to 18 participants in Game A
and 15 in Game B.
In the above analysis we compared the mean entrance frequencies with the prediction
of the three concepts in mixed strategies. However, there are also further asymmetric
equilibria in pure strategies. In these equilibria one player always enters an occupied
market whereas the other never does. Of course at equilibrium the first type of
player never gets an opportunity to enter an occupied market but nevertheless it
is his strategy to do this if he can. In our experimental setup coordination at an
asymmetric pure equilibrium is possible, since one type of players decides to enter a
market or not in odd periods and the other one in even periods.
As mentioned there exist a remarkable portion of players who always enter the
market, but the number of players who never enter is extremely small. Over all
periods there is no single player who never entered an occupied market and for the
last 50 decisions only 1 player in Game A and 3 players in Game B did so. Not
enough players choose such low entry rates that the predictive power of the pure-
strategy equilibria can compete with the mixed Nash equilibria, mixed impulse-
balance equilibria and the mixed payoff-sampling equilibria. But nevertheless it is
quite possible that learning processes produce a tendency towards a coordination at
an asymmetric pure equilibrium. In the following we shall argue that a tendency in
this direction can be observed in our data and that eventually in longer experiments
this process might lead to the pure-strategy equilibria.
The decrease of changes, as discussed in the previous section, might be a sign for a
convergence towards the pure-strategy equilibria, in which one player type always
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enters an occupied market and the other one never does. Of course it cannot be
predicted how the roles in the asymmetric equilibria will be distributed to the players
deciding in odd and even rounds. However, we can compare the relative frequencies
of entries into occupied markets for players deciding in odd and even periods in
the first 50 and the second 50 decisions. Therefore we form the quadratic distance
between the entrance rates in even and odd periods. Table IV.5 gives these quadratic
distances for the first and second 50 rounds per observation and game.
Observation Game A Game B
1-50 51-100 1-50 51-100
1 0.0007 0.0067 0.0536 0.6834
2 0.0002 0.1444 0.3155 0.8711
3 0.0097 0.0940 0.0678 0.2008
4 0.0025 0.1182 0.3642 0.6765
5 0.0125 0.0072 0.1326 0.4799
6 0.0465 0.1764 0.0518 0.0700
7 0.0312 0.0933 0.0360 0.3202
8 0.1044 0.0614 0.0526 0.1729
9 0.0021 0.0982 0.2136 0.0209
10 0.0044 0.0281 0.3141 0.3184
11 0.0405 0.0058 0.0463 0.2872
Mean 0.0231 0.0758 0.1498 0.3728
Table IV.5: Quadratic distance between entry in odd and even periods
In 18 of the 22 observations the quadratic distance of entries in odd and even rounds
increased over time, as the mean distance over all observations did. A tendency
towards coordination to a pure-strategy equilibrium would lead to such an increase.
The two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test between the quadratic distances in the first
and second 50 decisions over both games reveals a highly significant difference with
p = 0.002.
One realizes that the quadratic distances between even and odd rounds are higher in
Game B than in Game A. Recall that in Game B, not entering an occupied market
is more attractive than in Game A and therefore results in lower entry rates. Lower
entry rates in case of an occupied market enhance the coordination and the crowding
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out of potential entrants, respectively. Nevertheless, in both games the tendencies
are the same and statistically significant (Game A: p = 0.04; Game B: p = 0.01,
both two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
IV.F Summary and Discussion
In this paper three stationary concepts, namely mixed Nash equilibrium, impulse-
balance equilibrium, and payoff-sampling equilibrium, have been compared in an
experimental setting. The three stationary concepts had to describe the cumulated
behavior in two market entry games, which were based on the structure of a cyclic
game introduced by Selten & Wooders (2001).
Altogether 22 independent subject groups, eleven per game, participated in the
experiment. Each independent subject group consisted of 6 participants, three de-
ciding in odd rounds and three deciding in even rounds. Each subject group played
over 200 rounds with random matching. In the case of an empty market all three
theories predicted entry and nearly all participants acted accordingly.
In the case of an occupied market the three stationary concepts predict different
probabilities for entry. We used the mean squared distance between predicted and
observed frequencies as the measurement of the predictive success of a theory. The
comparison of the mean squared distances reveals the following order, from best to
worst: payoff-sampling equilibrium, impulse-balance equilibrium and mixed Nash
equilibrium. Pairwise testing shows that this order is statistically robust.
In addition to the mixed equilibrium the game also has two pure equilibria, in which
players deciding in odd periods always enter and those deciding in even periods
never enter, or vice versa. We observe a weak tendency towards these equilibria, as
the quadratic distance between the relative frequencies of entering in odd and even
periods is significantly higher in the second half of the experiment than in the first
one.
A further sign for this tendency is the number of strategy changes, which decreases
significantly over time. This inertia leads to a decreasing predictive success of the
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three stationary concepts over time. For the second 50 decisions payoff-sampling
equilibrium performs significantly better than impulse-balance equilibrium. This is
connected to the inertia and a pronounced drop of the entry rates in Game B, in
which payoff-sampling equilibrium predicts the lowest entry rates.
Nevertheless, the observed frequencies are far from those predicted by the pure equi-
libria and all mixed stationary concepts describe the data more accurately than the
pure-strategy equilibria. Our findings give support to the results of Selten & Chmura
(2008) where impulse-balance equilibrium and payoff-sampling equilibrium outper-
formed the mixed Nash equilibrium. In contrast to Selten & Chmura (2008) payoff-
sampling performs significantly better in our cyclic duopoly game than impulse-
balance equilibrium.
A plausible reason for this result might be the sequential move structure, which
makes the calculations of impulses for the case of not entering a market not as in-
tuitive as the general calculation of impulses in the 2 × 2 games. A player never
experiences an impulse, if he does not enter. In this case only hypothetical impulses
can be constructed on the basis of the idea that the other player follows the same
decision process as one does oneself. Therefore the partial lack of feedback makes
impulse-balance theory less applicable to cyclic games. While the calculation of im-
pulses is no longer as intuitive as for the 2x2 games, the drawing of payoff-samples
is not affected by the sequential move structure. Therefore payoff-sampling equilib-
rium might be the favorable approach to games with sequential moves. This line of
reasoning is supported by our observations from Game A, in which payoff-sampling
equilibrium performed significantly better than impulse-balance equilibrium for all
sample-sizes n > 2.
A second reason for the better performance of payoff-sampling might be the pa-
rameter of the sample sizes, which represents the detailedness of, or the effort for,
the underlying process of memorization. The free parameter might work in favor of
the payoff-sampling equilibrium. This thesis is supported by our overall comparison
and by the fact that over both games, payoff-sampling equilibrium performed sig-
nificantly better with only one third of the investigated sample sizes than impulse
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balance equilibrium.
Besides this, the question arises why the models with bounded rationality outperform
the concept of Nash equilibrium. While it is known that learning dynamics based on
Bayesian updating might lead to a Nash equilibrium (e.g., Kalai and Lehrer, 1993)
it is by no means clear that actual human learning mechanisms must converge to
Nash equilibrium. Our results suggest that at least for the short term of 200 rounds
human learning processes approach different points.13
We believe that our results might enrich various economic fields working with sta-
tionary concepts to describe, for example, the behavior of market participants, the
behavior in industrial organizations, the behavior in binary decisions and the be-
havior in bargaining situations. After all, behavioral stationary concepts might give
models a higher accuracy in describing the distribution of human behavior.
13Of course, stationary concepts are not the optimal approach to individual period-by-period
behavior, but the underlying ideas of impulse-balance equilibrium and payoff-sampling equilibrium
contain precise descriptions of behavior. Therefore they are predestined to be used as the basis
of learning models. Further studies should investigate whether those learning models are able to
capture subjects’ tendency towards the equilibria in pure strategies.
Chapter V
Learning in experimental 2× 2 games
V.A Introduction
It is known that rational learning, in the sense of Bayesian updating, leads to the
stationary points of the Nash equilibrium (e.g. Kalai and Lehrer, 1993). But it also
known that actual human behavior not necessarily converges to Nash equilibrium.
In fact, a vast body of literature indicates situations in which standard theory per-
forms not as a good predictor for subjects’ behavior in experiments (e.g. Brown &
Rosenthal, 1990, Erev & Roth, 1998).
A recent publication by Selten & Chmura (2008) documents the predominance of
behavioral stationary concepts regarding the descriptive power . In the paper the
concepts of impulse balance equilibrium (Selten & Chmura, 2008), payoff-sampling
equilibrium (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1998) and action-sampling equilibrium (Sel-
ten & Chmura, 2008) outperform Nash equilibrium in describing the decisions of
a population in twelve completely mixed 2 × 2 games. Moreover, payoff-sampling
equilibrium and action-sampling equilibrium perform better then quantal response
equilibrium (McKelvey & Palfrey, 1995) does. In addition does the parameter-free
concept of impulse-balance equilibrium perform equally well as the parametric con-
cept of quantal response equilibrium does.1
The three behavioral stationary concepts of action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-
sampling equilibrium and impulse balance equilibrium yield precise predictions of
1For further discussions please refer to Brunner, Camerer & Goeree (2010) and Selten, Chmura
& Goerg (2010).
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stationary behavior. Presumably stationary behavior is a result of a learning process
converging to a stationary distribution of actions for both players which is not nec-
essarily Nash equilibrium. It suggests itself to construct and to test simple learning
models with the predicted stationary states of the three concepts.
The main purpose of this chapter is to introduce four new learning models which are
based on the behavioral reasoning of payoff-sampling equilibrium, action-sampling
equilibrium and impulse balance equilibrium and test them in the environment of
twelve repeated 2×2 games. Hereby, the learning rules have to meet two challenges:
First, do they reproduce the aggregate behavior of a human population and second
do they adequately describe the observed behavior of a single individual? For com-
parison we include the models of reinforcement learning (Erev & Roth, 1998) and
self-tuning experience weighted attraction learning (EWA) (Ho, Camerer & Chong
, 2007) into our study.
We conduct simulations with the learning models and the twelve 2 × 2 games ex-
perimentally investigated in Selten & Chmura (2008). The simulations replicate the
exact situation of the 2× 2 experiments. In each simulation run, eight agents, four
deciding as row players and four deciding as column players, are randomly matched
each round over 200 rounds. In each simulation run one game is played and one
learning model is applied. To judge the predictive power on the aggregate level
we compare the distribution of choices in the simulation runs with the data from
Selten’s & Chmura’s 2× 2 experiments.
In addition we evaluate the explanatory power of the learning models for each partic-
ipant of the 2×2 experiments, separately. For each of the 864 subjects we compared
the actual decision in every round with the decision predicted by the learning model
given the subject’s history. To judge the power of the learning models we introduce
a benchmark which all learning models should beat. This benchmark is the inertia
rule, which predicts for each round the same choice as executed in the round before.
Our results are twofold, while our newly introduced models are able to capture the
distribution of decisions on the aggregate level much better then self-tuning EWA
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does, self-tuning EWA describes the individual data in a more accurate way. On
the aggregate level the learning models of impulse matching learning and action-
sampling learning have the smallest distance to the experimental data, while the
concepts of self-tuning EWA and reinforcement learning have biggest ones. On the
individual level self-tuning EWA and impulse-matching have the highest scores.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In section II we will introduce the
models impulse balance learning, impulse matching learning, action-sampling learn-
ing and payoff-sampling learning. In addition we will briefly deal with reinforcement
learning and self-tuning EWA. Afterwards, in section III, we will recapitulate the
experiment conducted in Selten & Chmura and introduce our measurements of pre-
dictive success for the aggregate data and for the individual data. Subsequently,
section IV gives our results and section V summarizes and concludes the chapter.
V.B The Learning Models
In this section we will introduce four new learning models, which are based on the
behavioral stationary concepts discussed in Selten & Chmura (2008). The concepts
to be introduced are: impulse balance learning, impulse matching learning, action-
sampling learning and payoff-sampling learning. In addition to the new learning
models, the more established concepts of reinforcement learning (c.p. Erev & Roth,
1998) and self-tuning EWA (Ho, Camerer & Chong , 2007) are briefly explained.
Three of the discussed models, namely action-sampling learning, payoff-sampling
learning and self-tuning EWA are parametric concepts. In case of action sample
learning and payoff sample learning the parameter is the sample size. Self-tuning
EWA is based on the multi-parametric concept of experience weighted attraction
learning (Camerer & Ho, 1999). Self-tuning EWA replaces two of the parameters
with numerical values and two with experience functions. The remaining "parameter
λ measures sensitivity of players to attractions" (p. 835 Camerer & Ho, 1999). The
version of reinforcement learning theory examined here does not have any parameter
and the initial propensities are not estimated from the data.
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For the sampling learning models we will not determine the optimal sample size,
but apply the sample sizes which determined the best fit for the related stationary
concepts to the data in Selten & Chmura (2008). In case of the action-sampling
learning this is the action-sampling equilibrium and in case of the payoff-sampling
learning this is the payoff-sampling equilibrium. The parameter of self-tuning EWA
is determined in such a way that it leads to the best fit over all data and over all
games.
In the literature parametric concepts are usually fitted for each game separately. We
believe that this gives an unfair advantage to one-parameter theories over parameter
free ones, especially in the case of 2×2 games where only two relative frequencies are
predicted. Adjusting one parameter separately for each game so to speak does half
the job. Therefore we base our analysis on one estimate for all games in case of the
self-tuning EWA and in case of the sampling learning rules we take the parameter
for the stationary concepts estimated in Selten & Chmura (2008) over all games.
V.B.1 Impulse Balance Learning
Impulse balance learning relates to the concepts of impulse balance equilibrium
(Selten, Abbink & Cox 2005 and Selten & Chmura 2008) and learning direction
theory (Selten & Buchta, 1999). After a decision and after the realization of the
payoffs the behavior is adjusted to experience. Selten and Buchta explain the concept
by the example of a marksman aiming at a trunk: "If he misses the trunk to the
right, he will shift the position of the bow to the left and if he misses the trunk to
the left he will shift the position of the bow to the right. The marksman looks at his
experience from the last trial and adjusts his behavior [...]." (p. 86 Selten & Buchta,
1999).
Suppose that the first of two actions has been chosen in a period and this action was
not the best reply to the action played by the other player. Then the player receives
an impulse towards the second action. This impulse is the difference between the
payoff the player could have received for his best reply minus the payoff actually
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received given the decision by the other player in this period. The player does not
receive an impulse if his action was a best reply against the other player’s decision.
To incorporate loss aversion, the impulses are not calculated with the original payoffs
but with transformed ones. In games with two pure strategies and a mixed Nash
equilibrium each pure strategy has a minimal payoff and the maximum of the two
minimal payoffs is called the pure strategy maximin. This pure strategy maximin
is the maximal payoff a player can obtain for sure in every round and it forms a
natural aspiration level. Amounts below this aspiration level are perceived as losses
and amounts above this aspiration level are perceived as gains. In line with prospect
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) losses are counted double in comparison to
gains. Thus, gains (the part above the aspiration level) are cut to half for the
computation of impulses. Figure 1 is taken from Selten & Chmura (2008) and
illustrates the transformation of the payoffs by the example of game 3.
3 
Figure 2: The curves for pU and qL arising in the example of game 1 for each of the five 
concepts. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Impulse Balance Transformation for the example of experimental game 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Impulse in the direction of the strategy not chosen. 
 
 
Figure V.1: Example of matrix transformation as given in Selten & Chmura (2008)
Impulse balance learning can be described as a process in which a subject builds up
impulse sums. The impulse sum Ri(t) is the sum of all impulses from j towards i
experienced up to period t−1. The probabilities for playing action 1 and 2 in period
t are proportional to the impulse sums R1(t) and R2(t) :
pi(t) =
Ri(t)
R1(t) +R2(t)
, for i = 1, 2 (V.1)
The impulses from action j towards action i in period t is as follows:
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ri(t) =
max[0, pii − pij] , if the chosen action is j0 else. (V.2)
for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. Here, pii is the payoff for action i given the matched agents
decision and pij the one for action j. Afterwards the impulse sums are updated with
the new impulses:
Ri(t+ 1) = Ri(t) + ri(t) (V.3)
In the first round all impulse sums are zero R1(1) = R2(1) = 0 and until both
impulse sums are higher than zero the probabilities are fixed to p1(t) = p2(t) = 0.5.
V.B.2 Impulse Matching Learning
This learning model is very similar to impulse balance learning. In fact, in our 2× 2
setting the resulting stationary point of impulse matching learning is the same as
of impulse balance learning. But for other types of games both concepts do not
necessarily lead to the same stationary points.2 Therefore we treat the impulse
matching learning as a self contained model. As in the case for the impulse balance
learning impulse matching learning is applied to the transformed matrix, described
in section A.
The idea of an impulse is different in impulse matching. Here it is assumed that
after a play a player always receives an impulse to his ex-post optimal strategy, the
best reply to the pure strategy chosen by the other player. Thus an impulse from
j towards i is defined as a payoff differences, regardless of the player’s own action.
This means that (V.2) has to be replaced by the equation (V.2).
ri(t) = max[0, pii − pij] (V.2)
The equation (B.1.) and (B.3.) are identically to (V.1) and (V.3) respectively. As
before pii is the payoff of action i and pij is the payoff of action j given the matched
2For a formal illustration of this point refer to the Appendix.
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player’s decision.
The name impulse matching is due to the fact that this kind of learning leads to
probability matching by player one if the probabilities p1 and (1− p1) on the other
side are fixed and the payoffs for the player is one if both players play the strategy
with the same number (one or two) and zero otherwise. Probability matching has
been observed in early learning experiments, e.g. Estes (1954).
V.B.3 Payoff-Sampling Learning
Payoff-sampling learning relates to the stationary concept of Osborne & Rubinstein
(1998) which was first applied to experimental data in Selten & Chmura (2008).
The behavioral explanation of the stationary concept is that a player chooses her
action after sampling each alternative an equal number of times, picking the action
that yields the highest payoff.
To implement this behavior payoff-sampling learning is based on samples from earlier
periods. The samples are randomly drawn with replacement and a fixed sample sizes
of n = 6.3 The agent draws two samples (s1(t), s2(t)) of earlier payoffs, one sample
with payoffs from rounds in which she chose action 1 and one with payoffs from
rounds in which she chose action 2. In the following S1(t) and S2(t) denote the
payoff sums in s1(t) and s2(t), respectively.
After the drawing of the samples, the cumulated payoffs S1(t) and S2(t) are cal-
culated and the action with the higher cumulated payoff is played, if there is one.
If the samples of both possible actions have the same cumulated payoff the agent
randomizes with p1 = p2 = 0.5.
pi(t) =

1 if Si(t) > Sj(t)
0.5 if Si(t) = Sj(t)
0 else
(V.3)
3Recall that n = 6 leads to the optimal fit for the payoff-sampling equilibrium to the experi-
mental data in Selten & Chmura (2008).
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for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
As before pi(t) is the probability of playing action i in period t. At the beginning
and until positive payoffs for each action have been obtained at least once, the agent
chooses both actions with equal probabilities, i.e. p1 = p2 = 0.5.
V.B.4 Action-Sampling Learning
Action-sampling learning relates to the idea of the action-sampling equilibrium of
Selten & Chmura (2008). According to action-sampling equilibrium a player takes
in the stationary state a fixed size sample of the pure strategies played by the other
players in the past and optimizes against this sample.
In the process of action-sampling learning the agent randomly takes a sample A(t)
with replacement of n earlier actions a1, ..., an of the other player. In the following
we are keeping n fixed to 12.4 Let pii(aj) be the payoff of action i if the opponent
plays action aj. For i = 1, 2 let Pi(t) =
∑7
j=1 pii(aj) be the sum of all payoffs of the
player for using her action i against the actions in this sample.
Therefore, in period t the player chooses her action 1 or 2 according to
pi(t) =

1 if Pi(t) > Pj(t)
0.5 if Pi(t) = Pj(t)
0 else
(V.4)
for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
At the beginning the probabilities are set to p1 = p2 = 0.5 until both possible actions
were played by the opponent agents.
4As mentioned above n = 12 leads to the highest fit of the action-sampling equilibrium to the
data in Selten & Chmura (2008). There was an error in the calculation of the optimal sample-size
in the original paper by Selten & Chumra, which yielded a sample-size of n = 7. For a detailed
discussion refer to Brunner, Camerer & Goeree (2010) and Selten, Chmura & Goerg (2010).
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V.B.5 Reinforcement Learning
The reinforcement learning is one of the oldest and well established learning mod-
els in the literature, refer to Harley (1981) for an early application in the field of
theoretical biology.
In our reinforcement model a player builds up a payoff sum Bi(t) for each of his
actions 1 and 2 according to the following formula:
Bi(t+ 1) =
Bi(t) + pi(t) if action i was chosen in tBi(t) else. (V.5)
Here pi(t) is the payoff obtained in period t. After an initial phase in which both
possible actions are used with equal probabilities the probability of choosing action
i in period t is given by:
pi(t) =
Bi(t)
B1(t) +B2(t)
(V.6)
This model presupposes that all payoffs in a player’s payoff matrix are positive with
the possible exception of one. All twelve games considered here have this property.
In the first round the initial payoff sums Bi(t) are zero. The initial phase ends as
soon as each of both possible actions has been used at least once. The player chooses
both possible actions with equal probabilities p1 = p2 = .5. Only from then on rule
V.6 is applied.
For games with negative payoffs this approach is not adequate. For example in the
model used by Erev & Roth (1998) the payoff pi(t) in E.1 was replaced by pi(t)−pimin,
where pimin is the smallest possible payoff of the player. Moreover they estimated
initial values Bi(0) from the data. We did not do this since we are only interested
in models with at most one parameter.
Chapter V - Learning in experimental 2× 2 games 78
V.B.6 Self-Tuning EWA
Self-tuning EWA was introduced by Ho, Camerer & Chong. It is based on the
experience weighted attraction model, but estimates the parameter of this model
with several functions. Of all models discussed in the chapter at hand, self-tuning
EWA is the most complex one.
The decisions are made according to attractions Ai(t) for each strategy. The attrac-
tions depend on an experience weight, a change-detector function and an attention
function. For more details on the attraction updating function refer to the appendix.
The probability of playing action i in period t depending on the attractions is cal-
culated as a logit response function:
pi(t) =
eλAi(t−1)∑2
j=1 e
λAj(t−1)
Here, λ is the response sensitivity and this parameter must be specified to fit to
the empirical data. We searched for one λ to yield the best fit over all 12 games.
Our measurement of the predictive success is the quadratic distance Q, which will
be explained in more detail in the next chapter. Figure V.2 gives the quadratic
distance for the different values of lambda.
Each point in the graph represents the mean quadratic distance over all twelve
games with 500 simulations runs per game with one specific lambda value. The
value leading to the smallest quadratic distance is λ = 0.28.
To be consistent with the other models we have chosen not to estimate any additional
values. Therefore the initial attractions were set to A1 = A2 = 0.
V.C Design
V.C.1 Games and Experiments
The experimental data, which are compared with the simulations, are those on which
the paper by Selten & Chmura (2008) is based. In their study twelve 2 × 2 games
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Figure V.2: Quadratic distances of self-tuning EWA for different lambdas, each
point represents the mean quadratic distance over 500 simulations.
were experimentally investigated. To cover a broad field of games, six constant and
six non-constant sum games were played. Figure C.5 shows the twelve games used
in the experiment. The constant sum games are shown on the left side of the figure
and the non-constant sum games on the right side.
Note that the first six games have the same best response structure as the second six
games and that the concepts of action-sampling equilibrium and Nash equilibrium
only depend on this best response structure. Thus the predictions of Nash equilib-
rium are the same for the first and the second six games. The same holds true for
the action-sampling equilibrium.
Each game was played by matching groups consisting out of eight subjects. The role
of the subjects were fixed for the whole experiment, thus four subjects decided as
column players and the other four as row players. At the beginning of each round
row and column players were randomly matched. After each of the 200 rounds
subjects received feedback about the other player’s decision, their own payoff, the
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Constant sum games Non-constant sum games
L R L R
Game 1
U 10 0
Game 7
U 10 48 18 12 22
D 9 10 D 9 149 8 9 8
L R L R
Game 2
U 9 0
Game 8
U 9 34 13 7 16
D 6 8 D 6 117 5 7 5
L R L R
Game 3
U 8 0
Game 9
U 8 36 14 9 17
D 7 10 D 7 137 4 7 4
L R L R
Game 4
U 7 0
Game 10
U 7 24 11 6 13
D 5 9 D 5 116 2 6 2
L R L R
Game 5
U 7 0
Game 11
U 7 22 9 4 11
D 4 8 D 4 105 1 5 1
L R L R
Game 6
U 7 1
Game 12
U 7 31 7 3 9
D 3 8 D 3 105 0 5 0
The payoffs for the column-players are shown in the lower right corner,
the payoff for the row-palyers are shown in the upper left corner.
Abbreviations used: L Left, R Right, U Up, D Down
Figure V.3: The twelve 2× 2-games taken from Selten & Chmura (2008).
period number and their own cumulative payoff. The game played was known by
all subjects.
For each constant sum game twelve independent matching groups were gathered,
for each non-constant sum game six independent matching groups were gathered.
Overall 864 subjects participated.
The main goal of the present chapter is to find learning algorithms which can repli-
cate the human behavior in this twelve games. To evaluate this problem we compare
the simulations with the experiments on the aggregate level and on the individual
basis.
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V.C.2 Measure of Predictive Success on the Aggregate Level
On the aggregate level everything is kept the same as in the experiment except
that instead of real participants now computer agents interact. Each agent interacts
according to her history and to one learning model over 200 rounds. In each round
eight agents with fixed roles, four deciding as row players and four as column players
are randomly matched.
After each round they receive feedback about the matched agent’s decision and their
payoff. Since none of the learning models makes use of the round number and since
the calculation of the cumulated payoff can be done by the agents themselves this
information is not provided to the agents. It is crucial that the agents do not receive
more information than the subjects in the experiment did.
All learning models include stochastic elements. To avoid the influence of statistical
outliers 500 simulation runs per game are conducted. In each simulation run all
agents act in accordance with one learning model, thus our data set obtained by the
simulations consists out of 500 simulations per game and learning model.
To measure the predictive success on the aggregate basis, we will compare the mean
frequencies of U and L in the simulations with the mean frequencies obtained in the
experiments by means of the quadratic distance.
The mean quadratic distance Q is the average quadratic distance over all 12 games
and over all 500 simulations for each of these
Q =
1
12
12∑
i=1
(
1
500
500∑
n=1
(sLin − fLi )2 + (sUin − fUi )2
)
,
whereas sin is the frequency for L or U in game i and simulation run n and fi the
mean frequency for L or U observed in the experiments with game number i.
The predictive success of a learning model increases with a decrease of the mean
quadratic distance, i.e. the smaller the mean quadratic distance is the better does
the learning theory fit the experimental data on the aggregate level.
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V.C.3 Measure of Predictive Success on the Individual Level
To judge the performance on the individual level we compare the individual decisions
in every round with the predicted decisions or predicted probability by the learning
rule, given the history of the subject.
To measure the predictive success of the learning theories describing the behavior
of a single individual we apply the quadratic scoring rule. It was first introduced
by Brier (1950) in the context of weather forecasting. The rationale behind the
quadratic scoring rule is that for each round a score is determined which evaluates
the nearness of the predicted probability distribution to the observed outcome.
In Selten (1998) the quadratic scoring rule is axiomatically characterized. The char-
acterizing properties of the quadratic scoring rule as described in Selten (1998) are:
symmetry, elongational invariance, incentive compatibility and neutrality. Symme-
try means that the score of a theory must not depend on the numbering on the
names of the decision alternatives. Elongational invariance assures that the score
of a theory is not influenced by adding or leaving an alternative which is predicted
with a probability of zero. Incentive compatibility requires that predicting the actual
probabilities yields the highest score. Finally, neutrality means that in the compar-
ison of two theories among which one is right in the sense that it predicts the actual
probabilities and the other is wrong the score for the right theory does not depend
on which of the two theories is the right one. This means that the score does not
prejudge one of the theories depending on the location of the theory in the space of
probability distribution.
We apply the quadratic scoring rule to measure the predictive success of a theory
for every period and subject separately and then add up over subjects, rounds and
games. Accordingly a score depending on the predicted probabilities and the ac-
tually observed action is computed. In order to compute the score the observation
is interpreted as a frequency distribution where for the chosen action the relative
frequency is one and for the not chosen action zero. Thus the quadratic score q(t)
of a learning theory for subject choosing action i in period t is given as:
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q(t) = 2pi(t)− pi(t)2 − (1− pi(t))2
Here pi(i) is the predicted probability of the learning theory. The predicted proba-
bility of the learning theory is calculated by applying the theory’s learning algorithm
on the whole playing history of this player. If no history is available we assume that
the player randomizes with .5.
The concepts of action-sampling learning and payoff-sampling learning always yield
probability 1, 0 or 1
2
for one of the possible actions. Which action is chosen depends
on the randomly drawn sample. Therefore we calculate the probability of drawing a
sample that commands playing action 1 or action 2 as the predictions of these two
concepts.
If a player decides completely in line with the prediction of the theory he receives a
score of 1 if he decides in complete contrast to the prediction the theory he receives
a score of −1.
The mean score q¯ is given as the mean of q(t) over all 200 rounds, 12 games and
108 subjects groups of 8 subjects each. Of course q¯ must be in the closed interval
between −1 and +1.
V.D Results
In this section we will first take a look at the simulations and the experiments on
the aggregate level. We will start with the relative frequencies for U and L observed
in the simulations with the different learning models and compare them with the
experimental data. Then we will take a closer look at the simulations and start by
comparing the results obtained in the constant sum games with the results in the
non-constant sum games. Afterwards we will investigate how the learning models
perform in the original matrices and in the transformed matrices. Thereafter we
will compare the overall mean quadratic distances to the experimental data. We
will conclude our examination on the aggregate level by testing the robustness of
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the overall result over time and therefore compare the performance of the learning
rules in the first and second 100 rounds.
The second part of this section deals with the individual behavior. There we will
check for the subjects in the 2×2 experiments how well they conform in the average
to each of the learning theories.
V.D.1 Aggregate Behavior
Table V.1 gives the observed mean frequencies for each game and simulation type
and as well as the observed ones in the experiments. For the experimental games 1
to 6 the mean frequency observed in a game is based on the observed frequencies in
twelve independent matching groups, for games 7 to 12 it is based on the observed
frequencies in six independent matching groups. Each matching group consists out of
eight subjects. For each learning type and game the mean is based on 500 simulation
runs, which produced 500 independent matching groups per game. Each matching
group consists of eight agents.
Impulse Impulse Action- Reinforce- Payoff- self-tuning Experiment
Game balance matching sampling ment sampling EWA Selten & Chmura
learning learning learning learning learning learning (2008)
1 L 0.416 0.574 0.710 0.345 0.746 0.499 0.690
U 0.164 0.063 0.095 0.121 0.054 0.499 0.079
2 L 0.417 0.495 0.571 0.333 0.519 0.477 0.527
U 0.282 0.169 0.193 0.161 0.070 0.502 0.217
3 L 0.593 0.770 0.763 0.503 0.893 0.541 0.793
U 0.227 0.157 0.211 0.128 0.169 0.492 0.163
4 L 0.581 0.714 0.711 0.587 0.854 0.548 0.736
U 0.309 0.259 0.295 0.190 0.312 0.494 0.286
5 L 0.535 0.632 0.639 0.566 0.798 0.524 0.664
U 0.350 0.296 0.323 0.241 0.370 0.495 0.327
6 L 0.540 0.602 0.596 0.666 0.767 0.527 0.596
U 0.419 0.400 0.422 0.265 0.466 0.497 0.445
7 L 0.475 0.637 0.709 0.380 0.781 0.564 0.564
U 0.198 0.098 0.094 0.170 0.099 0.485 0.141
8 L 0.485 0.563 0.572 0.396 0.753 0.540 0.586
U 0.336 0.258 0.193 0.217 0.287 0.494 0.250
9 L 0.601 0.767 0.762 0.525 0.862 0.600 0.827
U 0.248 0.185 0.212 0.165 0.177 0.489 0.254
10 L 0.602 0.726 0.711 0.640 0.852 0.587 0.699
U 0.335 0.303 0.295 0.219 0.309 0.487 0.366
11 L 0.560 0.648 0.640 0.609 0.790 0.572 0.652
U 0.382 0.354 0.324 0.289 0.369 0.492 0.331
12 L 0.557 0.605 0.596 0.560 0.623 0.578 0.604
U 0.459 0.466 0.422 0.342 0.595 0.494 0.439
Table V.1: Relative frequencies observed in simulations and experiments for Up and
Left
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As mentioned before games 1 to 6 and games 7 to 12 have the same best response
structure. The concept of action-sampling equilibrium depends only on this structure
and therefore leads in Selten & Chmura to the same predictions in the constant and
an non-constant sum games. Since action-sampling learning is based on best replies,
it does not surprise, that the frequencies in the simulations with games 1-6 are very
similar to those with games 7-12. For all other learning models different frequencies
are observed in the constant and non-constant sum games.
It is surprising that self-tuning EWA yields relative frequencies very near to .5 for
each of the twelve games. This is probably connected to the fact, that we estimate
the free parameter of this model jointly for all games. However as we have already
pointed out estimating parameters for each game separately would not be adequate.
V.D.1.1 Constant Sum and Non-Constant Sum Games
Table V.1 shows that the behavior of the subjects in the experiments differ in the
constant (games 1 - 6) and non-constant sum games (games 7 - 12). Therefore, we
will start comparing the predictive success of the learning models in constant and
non-constant sum games. Figure V.4 gives the mean quadratic distance in constant
and non-constant games for each learning theory.
The models of self-tuning EWA, reinforcement learning and impulse balance learn-
ing perform much better in the non-constant sum games. The concept of impulse
matching learning performs slightly better in the non-constant sum games. In con-
trast, the two learning rules relying on samples, namely action-sampling learning
and payoff-sampling learning, perform better in the constant sum games.
V.D.1.2 Original Versus Transformed Games
The concepts of impulse balance learning and impulse matching learning are applied
to the transformed game rather than the original one. But the ideas behind these
concepts could also be applied directly to the original games as well as the other
concepts could be applied to the transformed games. Figure V.5 shows the over-
all mean quadratic distances for self-tuning EWA learning, reinforcement learning,
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Figure V.4: Mean quadratic distance in constant and non-constant sum games
payoff-sampling learning, impulse balance learning, action-sampling learning and
impulse matching learning applied to the original games and to the transformed
games.
For the original as well as for the transformed matrices the results are based on 500
simulation runs per game and learning model.
It can be seen that impulse balance learning, impulse matching learning and rein-
forcement learning perform better when applied to the transformed games whereas
self-tuning EWA learning, payoff-sampling learning and action-sampling learning do
less well. While the improvement of impulse balance learning and impulse matching
learning in transformed games is expected, the benefit of applying reinforcement
learning to transformed games is unexpected. This improvement is substantial, in
the original game the quadratic distance is 22% higher than in the transformed ones.
The theory of Roth and Erev (1998) already applies a transformation of the original
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Figure V.5: Mean quadratic distance in original and transformed games
game by replacing the payoff of a player by it’s difference to the minimal value in her
matrix. The transformation used here is different since it involves double weights for
losses with respect to the pure strategy maximin. Nash equilibrium is the stationary
concept corresponding to the reinforcement learning theory. However, in Selten &
Chmura (2008) we did not observe an improvement of the predictive power of the
Nash equilibrium applied to the transformed game rather the original one. It is
interesting that the picture looks different for the simulations over 200 rounds.
V.D.1.3 Overall Comparison
Figure V.6 gives the mean of the quadratic distance between the experiment and
simulations over all games and rounds for self-tuning EWA learning, reinforcement
learning, payoff-sampling learning, impulse balance learning, action-sample learning
and impulse matching learning.
The figure reveals an order of explanatory power. The order from worse to best
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Figure V.6: Overall mean quadratic distance over all games
(highest quadratic distance to lowest quadratic distance) is as follows: reinforce-
ment learning, self-tuning EWA learning, payoff-sampling learning, impulse balance
learning, action-sampling learning and impulse matching learning.
The difference between self-tuning EWA and reinforcement is very small and irrel-
evant. However the small difference between the two quadratic deviations does not
mean that both theories make similar predictions. This can be seen in table V.1.
Recall figure V.4, which demonstrates that self-tuning EWA performs better than
reinforcement learning in the non-constant sum games, while reinforcement learning
performs better in the constant-sum games.
The figure demonstrates that the concepts of self-tuning EWA and reinforcement fail
to describe the aggregate behavior in the 2× 2 experiments in contrast to the other
concepts. Out of these new concepts especially the processes of action-sampling
learning and impulse matching learning lead to results which are very close to sub-
jects’ behavior. Already the concept of payoff-sampling learning has a nearly 40%
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lower quadratic distance than self-tuning EWA and the quadratic distance of impulse
matching is over 18 times smaller.
The order given by figure V.6 is statistically robust. Because of the high number
of observations, 6000 per learning type, all differences (even the slight ones between
self-tuning EWA and reinforcement) are statistically significant on a high level (for
all p < 0.001 two-sided Man-Whitney u-test).
V.D.1.4 Changes over Time
Learning processes are always dependent on time and history and therefore it is of
interest to check whether our above results remain stable over time. To check stabil-
ity of the order of explanatory power over time we compare the first hundred periods
with the second hundred periods. Figure V.7 gives the mean quadratic distances
for periods 1-100 (left) and 101-200 (right) for the six learning models. Basis of the
comparison is always the observed mean frequencies for the corresponding rounds
(either round 1-100 or 101-200) in the experiments.
It is easy to recognize that in the second half of the simulation runs the explana-
tory power of self-tuning EWA, reinforcement learning and impulse balance learning
decreases. For payoff-sampling learning and impulse matching learning the perfor-
mance is improved in the second half. The concept of action-sampling learning is
rather stable over time and no relevant differences are observed over time.
For all theories the quadratic distance in the first and second half of the experiment
differs significantly (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test p < 0.0000). For the neg-
ligible disimprovement of action-sampling learning the high level of significance is
caused by the high number of observations.
The comparison over time confirms the order of explanatory power obtained in the
overall comparison. This order is stable over all concepts.
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Figure V.7: Mean quadratic distance over time
V.D.1.5 Comparison with the stationary concepts
To conclude the analyses on the aggregate level the learning models are compared
with their corresponding stationary concepts.
Of all learning models only impulse matching learning and action-sampling learning
are quite close to their stationary counterparts after 200 periods. The quadratic
distances between impulse matching learning and impulse balance equilibrium as well
as between action-sampling learning and action-sampling equilibrium are smaller
than 0.001. The other distances between a learning rule and the related equilibrium
are much greater: impulse balance learning (0.019), payoff-sampling learning (0.048),
and reinforcement learning (0.158). Self-tuning EWA has a much higher distances
towards all stationary concepts.
It is striking that the order of the quadratic distance between a learning rule and
its corresponding concept is exactly the same as the order of the predictive success.
In other words: the lower the quadratic distance to the corresponding concept the
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higher the predictive success of the learning rule as given in section V.D.1.3. A
Spearman rank-correlation confirms this connection as highly significant (ρ = 0.8418
and p < 0.0001).5
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Figure V.8: Mean quadratic distances of the stationary concepts and the learning
models to the observed behavior
But how well do the learning models describe the experimental data compared to
the stationary concepts? Figure V.8 gives the mean quadratic distances between
the investigated learning rules and the data and, if existing, the quadratic distances
between the stationary counterparts and the data. The mean quadratic distances
of the stationary concepts are either taken from Selten & Chmura (2008) or from
Brunner, Camerer & Goeree (2010).6
The learning models of self-tuning EWA, reinforcement and payoff-sampling are
5The correlation is positive since the quadratic distance to the data is used as the measurement
of predictive success. Self-tuning EWA is not included into this analysis, because there exists no
corresponding stationary concept.
6There were some flaws in the paper by Selten & Chmura (2008). For a detailed discussion refer
to Brunner, Camerer & Goeree (2010) and Selten, Chmura & Goerg (2010).
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clearly outperformed by all stationary concepts. Impulse balance learning performs
only better than Nash equilibrium and worse than the other equilibria. In contrast
to these four models, the learning models of action-sampling and impulse match-
ing perform very well. Both learning models have a higher predictive success than
the other learning models and additionally a higher predictive success than all sta-
tionary concepts. Impulse matching learning does not only perform better than its
corresponding stationary concept but also as the related concept of impulse balance
learning.
V.D.2 Individual Behavior
In this section we will take a closer look at subjects’ decisions and whether they are
in accordance with one of the learning theories. Therefore we will use the quadratic
scoring rule, as introduced in section V.C.3. Recall, that in contrast to the quadratic
distance the higher the value of the quadratic score the better the fit is. The analysis
for the three parametric concepts are either based on the parameters calculated in
Selten & Chmura (2008) (payoff-sampling and action-sampling) or the one with the
best fit on the aggregate level (self-tuning EWA).
In addition to the investigated learning rules we introduce one heuristic which we
call the inertia rule. This rule commands to "do exactly the same as in the preceding
round". Of course this does not apply to the first period in which both possible
actions are chosen with equal probabilities. The player is required to repeat the
decision of the preceding period even if he deviated from this rule in the past.
Obviously, the inertia rule is not a serious decision rule, but it serves as a benchmark
that every learning rule should beat. A second benchmark is the score, which an
agent would receive if he decides randomly between the two actions with p = 0.5.
In this case the score would be 0.5 and again every learning rule should beat this
benchmark.
Figure V.9 gives the mean quadratic scores in the 108 independent observations for
each learning model and the inertia benchmark. The dark line represents the 0.5
benchmark.
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Figure V.9: Mean quadratic scores in the 108 observations with different learning
models
The figure reveals a clear order of predictive success, from best to worst: self-tuning
EWA, impulse matching learning, reinforcement learning, payoff-sampling learning,
action-sampling learning, the inertia benchmark and impulse balance learning. The
plot shows that all models, except impulse balance learning, perform better than
the inertia benchmark and the 0.5 benchmark.
In 62 observations out of 108 independent observation groups self-tuning EWA has
the highest score, in 36 observations impulse-matching is the concept that describes
the data best and in 9 observations reinforcement has the highest score. Applying
a two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the pairwise comparison of the mean
scores over the independent observations reveals that the order given by the plot
is statistically robust. All pairwise comparisons between two models are at least
significant on the 1% level.
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V.E Discussion
In this chapter the models of impulse matching learning, impulse balance learning,
action-sampling learning and payoff-sampling learning have been introduced and
together with reinforcement learning and self-tuning EWA applied and tested in the
environment of repeated 2× 2 games.
The newly introduced learning models are based on the behavioral reasoning of
payoff-sampling equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium and impulse balance equi-
librium, which had been successfully tested in experimental 2×2 games by Selten &
Chmura (2008). Therefore the experimental dataset obtained by Selten & Chmura
(2008) were used as a testbed for the learning models. The experimental data com-
prises aggregate and individual behavior in 12 completely mixed 2 × 2 games, 6
constant sum games with 12 independent subject groups each, and 6 nonconstant
sum games with 6 independent subject groups each. Each subject group consists of
eight participants being randomly matched over 200 periods.
The learning models had to prove whether they can replicate the aggregate behavior
of the experimental population and whether they can explain the individual behavior
of single subjects. For the comparison with the aggregate behavior 500 simulation
runs per game and learning model were conducted. As in the experiment, 200 rounds
with random matching and four agents deciding as row players and four agents as
column players were simulated. Our measure of predictive power for the aggregate
is the quadratic distance between observed relative frequencies in simulation runs
and the mean frequencies observed in the experiments. For the comparison with
the individuals’ behavior the models were applied to the history of each participant.
Then the actual decisions of every round were compared with the predictions of the
learning models given the subject’s history. For each subject and round a quadratic
score, a measurement for the accuracy of a prediction, was calculated and averaged
over rounds, subjects and games.
For our comparisons with the aggregate and the individual behavior we can conclude
two main results:
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Main Result 1: The models of learning are able to replicate the aggregate behavior
in our 2 × 2-games. In our study the models of impulse matching learning and
action-sampling learning prove to be especially successful.
The comparison of the six models yields the following order of predictive success from
best to worst: Impulse matching learning, Action-sampling learning, Impulse bal-
ance learning, Payoff-sampling learning, Reinforcement learning, Self-tuning EWA
learning. Due to the high number of simulation runs, this order is statistically ro-
bust, all pairwise comparisons with the two-sided Man-Whitney u-test are at least
significant on the 0.1% level.
The predominance of the new models, impulse matching learning, action-sampling
learning, impulse balance learning and payoff-sampling learning, over the established
models of reinforcement learning and self-tuning EWA is stable over time and across
the different game types (constant sum and non-constant sum games). One possible
reason for the predominance of the new models, especially over self-tuning EWA is
that we insisted on adjusting parameters as less as possible. A further interesting
result is that for reinforcement learning the quadratic distance to the data is round
about 22% lower if applied to the transformed matrixes instead to the original ones.
Main Result 2: Nearly all investigated models of learning describe the individual
behavior in our 2×2 games better then a simple inertia rule and simple randomization
with 0.5 does. The highest score is observed for the model of self-tuning EWA.
Overall, all models, except impulse balance learning, perform better than simple
randomization with .5 and the inertia benchmark does. The new models are outper-
formed, on the individual level, by self-tuning EWA. Only impulse matching learning
performed similarly good, but nevertheless with a significantly smaller score then
self-tuning EWA.
For the models action-sampling learning and payoff-sampling learning we did not ad-
just the sample sizes to the data, but applied the sample sizes which were determined
in Selten & Chmura (2008). The parameter of self-tuning EWA was determined in
such a way that it lead to the best fit over all data and over all games on the
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aggregate level. It remains to be shown how good the new parametric concepts
of action-sampling and payoff-sampling learning perform if we allow for additional
adjustments to the data.
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Introduction
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. Please read these instructions very
carefully. It is very important that you do not talk to other participants for the time
of the entire experiment. In case you do not understand some parts of the exper-
iment, please read through these instructions again. If you have further questions
after this, please give us a sign by raising your hand out of your cubicle. We will
then approach you in order to answer your questions personally.
To guarantee your anonymity you will draw a personal code before the experiment
starts. Please write this code on top of every sheet you use during this experiment.
You will later receive your payment from this experiment by showing your personal
code. This method ensures that we are not able to link your answers and decisions
to you personally.
During this experiment you can earn money. The currency within the experiment
is ‘Taler’. The exchange rate from Taler to NIS is:
1 Taler = 2.5 NIS
Your personal income from the experiment depends on both your own decisions
and on the decisions of other participants. Your personal income will be paid to
you in cash as soon as the experiment is over.
During the course of the experiment, you will interact with a randomly assigned
other participant. The assigned participant makes his/her decisions at the same
point in time as you do. You will get no information on who this person actually is,
neither during the experiment, nor at some point after the experiment. Similarly,
the other participant will not be given any information about your identity. You
will receive information about the assigned participant’s decision after the entire
experiment has ended.
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After the experiment, please complete a short questionnaire, which we need for the
statistical analysis of the experimental data.
Instructions 112
Description of the experiment (PDP)
In this experiment you are randomly matched with another participant. You act
as Person A, and the randomly assigned other participant acts as Person B. You
and Person B must simultaneously make a similarly structured decision.
Person A and Person B first receive an initial endowment of 10 Talers.
You now have the opportunity to transfer any part of your endowment to Person B.
You can only transfer integer amounts - thus, you can only choose amounts aA ∈
[0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10].
The amount you transfer to Person B is doubled. That means that Person B
receives twice the amount you have transferred to him/her.
The randomly assigned participant acting as Person B is given exactly the same
alternatives as you have. He/she also has the possibility to transfer any amount to
you. The amount Person B transfers to you is also doubled. That means that you
receive twice the amount Person B has transferred to you.
You will make your decisions simultaneously. During the course of the experiment
neither person receives any information concerning the decision of the other person.
How the income is calculated
Your personal income can be calculated as follows:
Initial endowment
- amount you choose to transfer to Person B
+ twice the amount b Person B transferred to you
= your personal income
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Description of the experiment (PDN)
In this experiment you are randomly matched with another participant. You act
as Person A, and the randomly assigned other participant acts as Person B. You
and Person B must simultaneously make a similarly structured decision.
Person A and Person B first receive an initial endowment of 10 Talers.
You now have the opportunity to transfer any part of Person B’s endowment to
yourself. You can only transfer integer amounts - thus, you can only choose amounts
aA ∈ [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10].
The remaining amount - that is the amount that you do not transfer from Person
B’s endowment to yourself - is doubled. This means that Person B receives twice
the amount that you do not transfer from him/her.
The randomly assigned participant acting as person B is given exactly the same
alternatives as you have. He/she also has the possibility to transfer any amount
to himself/herself. The remaining amount that he/she does not transfer from your
endowment to himself/herself is doubled. This means that you receive twice the
amount that he/she does not transfer from you.
You will make your decisions simultaneously. During the course of the experiment,
neither person receives any information concerning the decision of the other person.
How the income is calculated
Your personal income can be calculated as follows:
+ amount you choose to transfer from Person B to yourself
+ twice the amount Person B did not transfer from your endowment
to himself/herself
= your personal income
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Teams
This is the English translation of the instructions used in treatments 345COM and 444COM. In
treatment 345SUB, the table and examples were adjusted to fit the production function.
Welcome to this decision-making experiment. Please read the following instructions
carefully. The experiment will be conducted anonymously, that is to say you will not
learn with whom of the other participants you are interacting. Please keep in mind
that from now on and throughout the experiment you are not allowed to talk to
the other participants. If you have any questions, please give a signal with
your hand and we will come to you. During the experiment you can earn Taler. How
much you earn depends on your decisions and the decisions of the other participants
in your group. At the end of the experiment these Taler will be converted to Euro
at an exchange rate of 80 Taler = 1 EURO. The Euro amount will be paid out
to you. You will be called to collect your earnings. Please turn in all instruction
sheets when you collect your earnings.
In this experiment you will be randomly divided into groups of three persons. To-
gether with two other participants you form a group. Each participant decides
whether he wants to work normal or hard. The more participants choose to work
hard, the more units of goods will be produced.
Number (#) of hard working participants 0 1 2 3
Produced units of goods 20 40 65 100
Examples: In case that all participants of the group work normal, 20 units will be
produced altogether in your group. If you work hard and another participant in
your group works hard as well, 65 units will be produced altogether in your group.
etc... good
For each unit of goods produced, you receive a certain amount of Taler. At
the beginning of the experiment you are informed how many Taler you earn per
unit produced. Additionally, you learn how many Taler per unit the other two
participants in your group earn. Examples: In the beginning of the experiment you
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are told that you receive 5 Taler for each unit produced. In case that all participants
in your group work hard, 100 units will be produced and you receive 500 Taler. In
case that 40 units are produced, you receive 40 · 5 = 200 Taler. etc...
Costs: If you decide to work hard, the amount you receive is reduced by 90
Taler. If you work normal, no additional costs arise. Examples: You and another
participant in your group work hard, so 65 units are produced. Accordingly, you
receive 65 · 5 = 325 Taler. Since you worked hard, 90 Taler are taken away. Hence,
your final payment is 325− 90 = 235 Taler. If instead you worked normal, 40 units
would be produced. You would receive 40 ·5 = 200 Taler. Since you worked normal,
no Taler are subtracted from this amount. Hence, your final payment would be 200
Taler. etc...
In order to facilitate the decision-making process, each participant is informed in
detail about his own possible payoffs and the payoffs of the other two participants
in his group. The corresponding information is given in table form. For every
participant, a table lists all possible payments dependent on the own decision (to
work normal or hard) and the decisions of the other two participants in the group
(none, one or both work hard). In these tables, the corresponding costs for working
hard have already been subtracted. Below, you see an example with fictional data:
In the lower right part of the screen, you can see another table. At the beginning,
the table is empty. In order to display data, you first have to create a hypothetical
situation: In the table of participant number 2, click on the corresponding button
what you think how he will decide (to work normal or hard). Furthermore, in the
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table of participant number 3, click on the corresponding button what you think
about his decision (to work normal or hard). In the lower table you will then be
shown in the first row what the payment for you and the other two participants
would be, in case that your chosen situation actually occurs - and that you decide
to work normal. The second row lists the possible payments that you and the other
two participants would receive, in case that your chosen situation actually occurs -
and that you decide to work hard. At any time, you can display data for a different
situation. Simply change the situation by clicking on a different button underneath
the payment tables of participant number 2 and 3. Below you see another example
with fictional data:
Your decision: As soon as you have decided on whether you want to work hard
or normal, please click on the according button in the lower right table (on the
left hand side). The program will ask you to confirm your decision. Afterwards,
your decision will be transferred. Please remain in your cubicle and wait until all
participants have reached a decision. Afterwards, you will be informed about the
number of units produced in your group and about your payoff. This amount will
be paid to you in cash and anonymously at an exchange rate of 80 Taler = 1 EURO.
If you have any questions please give a signal with your hand!
The following instructions were distributed and read out aloud only after the first period.
In the following, the previous procedure will be repeated five times within the same
group of persons and with the same numerical values for production function and
Instructions 117
effort costs. In each of these five periods, you again have to choose between working
normal or working hard. In the end, we randomly select one of these five periods.
You will receive the payoff for the randomly selected period in addition to your
present payoff.
If you have any questions please give a signal with your hand! Otherwise, please
click to continue!
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B.III Experimental Investigation of Cyclic Duopoly Games
Thank you very much for participating in todays decision experiment. Please read
the following instruction carefully. If you do not understand something and have
some questions you can ask them at the end of the this introduction. As soon
as the experiment has started no more questions will be answered. If you still
have questions please take a look at this instructions. For the conduction of this
experiment it is necessary that you do not communicate with other participants.
Please do not talk with the other participants.
In this experiment you can earn money. Your payoff depends on your decisions and
other participant’s decisions.
The Experiment
The experiment consists out of 200 rounds. Decisions are done alternating, that
means that everyone decides every two rounds. To which half of the participants
you belong is only known to you.
In the rounds in which you make your decisions you are assigned to a market. Then
you will receive the status of the market, as the market is either free or occupied.
Then you can decide whether you want to enter the market or not. If you enter
the market you stay in the market for two rounds. If you do not enter the market
you stay outside the market for two rounds. After these two rounds and while the
200 rounds of the experiment are not exhausted you can decide again. After your
decision the first round is over and the second round begins in which players from the
other half of participants decide. After this player have decided the second round
is over and you will again be allocated to a market (mostly a new one). This is
repeated 100 times, thus there are 200 rounds to play.
Payoffs in the Experiment
In every round you receive a payoff.
If you do not enter the market you receive 5 Taler in the first round and 0 Taler in
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the second round.
If you enter the market you receive an amount in the first round which depends on
the status of the market. If the market is empty you receive in the first round a
payoff of 10 Taler. If the market is occupied you receive a payoff in the first round
of 2 Taler. In the second round your payoff depends on the decision made by the
next participant from the other group randomly allocated to this market. If this
participant enters the market you receive a payoff of 2 Taler, if he does not enter
you receive a payoff of 10 Taler.
The payoffs from this rounds are summed up and form your round payoffs. This
round payoffs are summed up over all rounds and form your total payoff at the end
of the experiment. Your payoff of this experiment is payed to you in Euro, where 1
Taler is 1 EuroCent.
The following tables should illustrate your payoffs:
Your payoffs in an empty market:
Next player
Enter Not Enter
You Enter 10 + 2 10 + 10Not Enter 5 5
Your payoffs in an occupied market:
Next player
Enter Not Enter
You Enter 2 + 2 2 + 10Not Enter 5 5
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Figure B.1: Screenshot decision screen
Figure B.2: Screenshot payoff screen
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C.I Presentation Effects in Cross-Cultural Experi-
ments
C.I.1 External analogy with the Classical PD and PG Games
To show external analogy of our continuous games with a classical binary-choice
PD we write down the 2 × 2-payoff matrix form of both designs including only
the extreme points of total (e.g., aPDPi = 10; aPDNi = 0) and no cooperation (e.g.,
aPDPi = 0; a
PDN
i = 10):
pi1, pi2 C2 D2
C1 k ·X, k ·X 0, X + k ·X
D1 X + k ·X, 0 X,X
Table 6: 2 × 2-matrix, representing the prisoner’s dilemma game.
The PD condition (1+k) ·X > k ·X > X > 0 is satisfied for all k > 1 in both games.
In our experiment this condition is fulfilled, with k = 2. Given these parameters,
by linear interpolation payoffs from the discrete payoff matrix can be obtained1.
Having a freely pre-determined range of possible actions a allows to obtain a non-
binary measure of cooperation.
We now show external analogy of both games with a typical PG-design. The payoff
function of a common 2-person PG is given by:
piPGi = Xi − ai + k ·
ai + aj
2
, with i 6= j, and k > 1
Xi represents player i’s initial endowment. The parameter ai is the investment into
the public good. Accordingly, Xi − ai represents the investment into the private
good. All investments made to the public good are multiplied by the factor k. The
fraction of one half of the increased public pie is returned to both players i and j by
the addition to their investments into the private good. For k < 1 it is rational for
both players to invest nothing into the public good since the public pie shrinks. In
1See also Verhoeff (1998).
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the case of k > 1 both players can increase their personal income by investing into
the public good. However, in this case each player has a strong incentive to free-ride
hoping to reach even higher returns caused by a positive investment of the second
player.
From the initial PG-equation we get:
pii = Xi − (1− k
2
) · ai + k · aj
2
⇐⇒ pii = Xi − θ · ai + k∗ · θ · aj, with θ = 1− k
2
, and k∗ =
k
2 · (1− k
2
)
The payoff-function of the PDP-game was given in equation by:
piPDPi = Xi − aPDPi + k · aPDPj
It is evident that both games are of the same type: A PG-game with parameter k∗ is
formally similar to the PDP-game with parameter k. Because of internal equivalence
among PDP and PDN it is obvious that the PDN-game is a PG too. Contrary to
the PG-game, in PDP and PDN there is no back flow of own investments. Thus,
each ai > 0 is transferred directly to the opposite player thereby providing a lower
individual incentive to cooperate.
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C.II Treating Equals Unequally - Incentives in
Teams
C.II.1 Additional Tables
Treatment
345SUB 345COM 444COM
Player type n=12 n=12 n=33
3 22.2%(9.3)
88.9%
(4.3) -
4 81.9%(6.6)
88.9%
(8.3)
72.2%
(5.6)
5 91.7%(4.4)
97.2%
(1.2) -
Mean 65.3% 91.7% 72.2%
Observations reflect individual subjects, for each of whom the percentage of ’work hard’ decisions out of the six
periods was calculated. The standard errors are given in parentheses.
Table C.1: Mean efficiencies (first row) and standard deviation (second row) for all
rounds per player type over the treatments
Player type 345COM 345COM
vs. vs.
345SUB 444COM
3 .0001 n.a.
4 n.s. n.a.
5 n.s. n.a.
Means .0004 .0649
Table C.2: Comparison of mean efficiencies by player types between different treat-
ments with two-sided rank-sum test.
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C.II.2 Additional Graphs
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Figure C.1: Effort per reward type over time in 345COM
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0 2 4 6 0 2 4 6 0 2 4 6 0 2 4 6
21 22 23 24
25 26 41 42
43 44 45 46
low−reward agent medium−reward agent
high−reward agent
Period (1−6)
Graphs by Unique Matching Group Number
Figure C.2: Effort per reward type over time in 345SUB
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Figure C.3: Effort per agent over time in 444COM
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Figure C.4: Boxplots of average group efficiency rates
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C.III Experimental Investigation of Cyclic Duopoly
Games
C.III.1 Additional Tables
Game A
Observation Market Empty Market Entries Relative Frequency
1 103 99 0.9612
2 109 109 1
3 131 130 0.9924
4 129 129 1
5 124 123 0.9919
6 131 131 1
7 126 121 0.9603
8 140 138 0.9857
9 104 103 0.9904
10 133 131 0.9850
11 162 154 0.9506
Game B
Observation Market Empty Market Entries Relative Frequency
1 324 320 0.9806
2 373 370 0.9943
3 356 355 0.9962
4 373 373 1
5 331 330 0.9960
6 366 364 0.9957
7 315 313 0.9921
8 352 348 0.9881
9 323 321 0.9929
10 348 346 0.9925
11 352 343 0.9727
Mean: 0,9798
Table C.3: Frequency of entries into an empty market
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Game A
Relative Mean quadratic distance
Observation FrequencyEntry
Nash
Equilibrium
Impulse balance
Equilibrium
Payoff-sampling
Equilibrium
1 .8068 .0046 .0240 .0008
2 .7841 .0083 .0174 .0000
3 .7292 .0213 .0060 .0023
4 .7325 .0203 .0065 .0020
5 .7479 .0161 .0092 .0009
6 .7271 .0219 .0056 .0026
7 .7447 .0170 .0086 .0011
8 .7065 .0284 .0030 .0051
9 .7963 .0062 .0208 .0003
10 .7259 .0222 .0054 .0027
11 .6552 .0483 .0000 .0151
Game B
Relative Mean quadratic distance
Observation FrequencyEntry
Nash
Equilibrium
Impulse balance
Equilibrium
Payoff-sampling
Equilibrium
1 .4222 .0221 .0007 .0000
2 .2262 .1189 .0496 .0391
3 .408 .0265 .0017 .0002
4 .3146 .0657 .0181 .0120
5 .4809 .0081 .0010 .0032
6 .3643 .0427 .0071 .0035
7 .5450 .0007 .0092 .0146
8 .4639 .0115 .0002 .0016
9 .4331 .0190 .0002 .0001
10 .4441 .0161 .0000 .0004
11 .5439 .0007 .0090 .0144
Table C.4: Frequency of entries into an occupied market and the quadratic distances
to the three concepts
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C.IV Learning in Experimental 2× 2 Games
C.IV.1 Impulse Matching and Impulse Balance
To show that the concepts of impulse balance equilibrium and impulse matching
equilibrium lead to the same stationary points in case of the 2 × 2 games, we take
a look at the structure of the investigated experimental 2× 2 games, as introduced
by Selten & Chmura (2008).
L R
U aL + cL aR
bU bU + dU
D aL aR + cR
dD + dD bD
Figure C.5: The Structure of the Experimental 2x2-Games
The figure shows the transformed payoffs, the payoffs for the column-players are
shown in the lower right corner and the payoff for the row-palyers are shown in the
upper left corner. The following equations must be fulfilled: aL, aR, bU , bD ≥ 0 and
cL, cR, dU , dD > 0. In the following pU and pD are the probabilities of the row player
for U and D and qL and qR are the probabilities for L and R by the column player.
In the following we will only look at the row player, the behavior in equilibrium of
the column player is calculated analogously.
In case of impulse balance equilibrium the expected impulses for each of both strate-
gies must be the same. Hereby, the row player receives only an impulse towards U
for the proportion of plays in which he would choose down (given by pD) and the
other player at the same time would have chosen L (given by qL). Therefore the
expected impulse for U is given by pDqLcL. Applying the same reasoning leads to
pUqRcR as the expected impulse for D of the row player. Thus the impulse balance
equation, which must be fulfilled in equilibrium is given as:
pDqLcL = pUqRcR
In case of impulse matching equilibrium, the row player receives always an impulse
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of cL towards U if the column player plays L. The column player does so with a
probability of qL. In addition the row player always receives an impulse of cR towards
D if the column player choses R. The column player plays R with a probability of
qR. Impulse matching equilibrium is reached if the ratio of the two probabilities of
U and D is the same as the ratio of expected impulses for U and D.
pU
pD
=
qLcL
qRcR
By transforming we obtain the impulse balance equation of impulse balance equilib-
rium:
pDqLcL = pUqRcR
Therefore, impulse matching equilibrium and impulse balance equilibrium have the
same mixed stationary points in case of the described 2× 2 games.
